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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis is a study of insurgent use of six basic principles of human persuasion 
and influence. These principles are put forth by Robert B. Cialdini in his work Influence: 
The Psychology of Persuasion.  The principles of influence put forth in Cialdini’s work 
are reciprocation, commitment and consistency, social proof, liking, authority, and 
scarcity. While past studies have sought to explain the manner in which insurgencies gain 
influence, there has not been a thorough study conducted using this particular framework. 
This thesis first provides an overview of Cialdini’s principles of influence, examining 
each of the six principles. Next, it will provide an historical look at six different 
insurgencies—the Viet Cong, the Mau Mau Uprising, the Irish Republican Army, the 
Bolshevik Revolution, the 26th of July Movement (Cuba), and EOKA (Cyprus)—and will 
examine the manner with which insurgents influence internal and external audiences.  
Next, a comparative case analysis examines the relative success of these influence tactics 
(or combination thereof), and the interrelations and relative importance of each of the six 
principles based on the study of the six insurgencies. Finally, this thesis will recommend 
possible applications of the study in conducting counterinsurgency. 
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A. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The subject of insurgency has been examined and analyzed to a great extent, 
especially in recent years.  David Kilcullen and Gordon McCormick, among others, have 
published studies on the topic in recent years.  The conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan 
have brought the study of insurgencies to the forefront of military research.  In this new 
age of warfare, conventional military force is no longer sufficient to combat swift, 
dispersed, and covert insurgent organizations.  Their ability to hide and operate among 
the indigenous population has made insurgents hard to combat with conventional forces.  
Because of the insurgents’ reliance on the local population, much effort has been 
expended in finding out how to undermine that support. 
The concepts of information warfare and influence have also been heavily 
discussed in recent years, yet these ideas are not entirely new to the conduct of warfare.  
The focus of many studies is the network of insurgency.  These studies often focus on the 
characteristics of the nodes of the insurgent networks.  For instance, Dr. McCormick 
describes the four key elements of an insurgent/counterinsurgent campaign and the 
interactions between the four elements.  His model describes the conditions necessary to 
gaining influence, but does not address the actual methods used to achieve those 
conditions  (McCormick, 1987).  This thesis seeks to address this problem. 
Others studies have also attempted to explain the methods used by insurgent 
organizations to gain internal and external influence.  For example, Dr. Kilcullen 
describes the various factions acting inside of a “Conflict Ecosystem.”  This model 
focuses on the interactions of the various actors and the inputs and outputs of the 
ecosystem as a whole (Kilcullen, 2005).  These studies use various frameworks and 
theories in order to explain the factors that determine the actions taken by insurgents in 
order to gain internal and external influence.  This thesis will explain these same factors 
but within a model of basic human and social psychology. 
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This thesis is a comparative case analysis of the use of six basic principles of 
human persuasion and influence, as outlined by Robert B. Cialdini in his work, Influence: 
The Psychology of Persuasion.  The principles of influence demonstrated in Cialdini’s 
work are reciprocation, commitment and consistency, social proof, liking, authority, and 
scarcity. These principles are then applied to six historical insurgent organizations—the 
Mau Mau, the 26th of July Movement, EOKA, the Bolshevik Party, the National 
Liberation Forces of South Vietnam, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army.  This 
thesis attempts to explain the factors that determine the types of actions taken by 
insurgent leadership to influence internal and external audiences. 
These six cases were chosen based on several factors.  First, the conflict in each 
case must have had a resolution of some kind.  This can either be a victory for either side, 
or a mutual agreement of peace, with no ongoing conflict.  This is due to the fact that this 
study examines the importance of Cialdini’s principles to success in an insurgent 
campaign.  Since the success or failure of enduring insurgencies, such as the Sunni 
insurgency in Iraq, has yet to be determined, these cannot be included in the study. 
The second aspect in these case studies is that they result in a variety of outcomes, 
from outright political and military victories for the insurgency to failure in both arenas, 
and places in between the two.  This is also important in determining the effects of the 
principles of influence on the success or failure of the insurgency. 
The third factor in choosing the case studies is the diversity of the insurgents’ 
motivations, goals, ethnicities, religions, and socio-economic backgrounds.  This 
diversity provides a multitude of settings in which the principles were applied, and helps 
determine whether these factors affected the decisions to utilize particular principles. 
While various frameworks have been used to analyze the influence of 
insurgencies, there has not been a thorough study conducted using this particular 
framework. While the outcome of this study may not be the answer to countering the 
influence of insurgents, it does provide another lens through which counterinsurgent 
forces can understand the influence strategies of insurgents. 
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This thesis explains the methods by which insurgents influence internal and 
external target audiences on the level of basic human psychology.  It also analyzes the 
relative success of these influence tactics (or combination thereof) and recommends the 
possible application of these conclusions to counterinsurgency efforts.  This study is not 
an extensive quantitative analysis of the use of Cialdini’s principles, but will provide a 
general framework with which to conduct further study.   
B. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is structured into five chapters.  Chapter I introduces the purpose of 
this research and the organization of the thesis.  Chapter II provides a short biography of 
Robert Cialdini to establish his expertise in the area of influence, summarizes Cialdini’s 
six principles of influence, and provides examples of their use.  This will be the 
framework on which the remaining chapters are based. Chapter III begins with a 
definition of insurgency.  Later, each subsection of the chapter will provide a brief 
historical background of each case study and describe the utilization of each principle of 
influence by the insurgencies.  Chapter IV analyzes the results of the qualitative data 
explained in Chapter III.  The chapter will first provide a basic summary of the results 
describing the factors that determine the types of actions taken by insurgent leaders to 
influence internal and external audiences.  Next, it will discuss the relative importance of 
each principle, followed by a discussion of the combinations of principles used by 
insurgencies.  Finally, the chapter will discuss the various levels at which the principles 
are applied and provide recommendations for counterinsurgency efforts.  Chapter V 
provides recommendations for further research and concludes the thesis.  
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II. THE SIX PRINCIPLES OF INFLUENCE 
A. OVERVIEW 
Doctor Robert B. Cialdini’s Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion is a study of 
the methods employed by professionals in order to elicit compliance from their target 
audiences.  The purpose of his study was to identify the techniques most commonly and 
effectively used by compliance practitioners.  He states that his interest in the subjects of 
compliance and persuasion stems from his personal susceptibility to the tactics of 
persuasion (Cialdini, 2007, p. ix).  While these practitioners were the focus of the study, 
Cialdini also observed that everyone employs and falls victim to these techniques on an 
everyday basis.  His study involved interviews with professionals and consumer agencies, 
in addition to the examination of literature used to convey these techniques.  Participant 
observation, however, was his most often used method.  In essence, this method requires 
that the observer disguise his intent in order to become a member of the group being 
studied.  This method—a tradition in scholarship with a long pedigree, going back 
through Leon Festinger’s When Prophecy Fails—allows the researcher to produce first-
hand accounts of the behavior of the test subjects.  In this way, Cialdini was able to 
“infiltrate” various advertising, public relations, and fund-raising agencies in order to 
learn these compliance methods from those that practice them. 
In his study, Cialdini observed that despite the numerous tactics used by 
compliance professionals, most of these techniques fall into six basic categories.  Each of 
the categories is “governed by a fundamental psychological principle that directs human 
behavior and, in so doing, gives the tactics their power” (Cialdini, 2007).  The 
principles—reciprocation, commitment and consistency, social proof, authority, liking, 
and scarcity—are each discussed at length in Influence.  His study is not meant to be 
prescriptive in nature, but is meant to inform his audience of these methods in order to 
recognize and possible counteract their use.  This chapter will briefly describe each of 
these principles of influence in addition to providing a short background of Dr. Cialdini 
and his history with the study of persuasion and influence.  
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B. BACKGROUND OF ROBERT B. CIALDINI 
Dr. Cialdini’s interest in social psychology began in 1963 at the University of 
Wisconsin, where he earned a Bachelor’s of Science in Psychology in 1967.  He 
continued his education in social psychology, receiving a PhD in social psychology from 
the University of North Carolina and conducting his post-doctoral training at Columbia 
University.  He has held Visiting Scholar Appointments at Ohio State University, the 
University of California, the Annenberg School of Communications, and the Graduate 
School of Business of Stanford University.  He is currently Distinguished Professor of 
Marketing and Regents’ Professor of Psychology at Arizona State University, and has 
been named a Distinguished Graduate Research Professor. 
Cialdini is considered an international expert in the areas of compliance and 
persuasion based on his scholarly background and his extensive research on the subject.  
His work has been covered in numerous business, psychology, and network media 
outlets.  He has worked closely with the Special Operations Command over the years.  
He is also the president of an international consulting, training, and planning firm based 
on his six principles of influence called Influence at Work, which has numerous business 
clients including IBM, Coca Cola, and Harvard University. 
C. CIALDINI’S PRINCIPLES OF INFLUENCE 
1. Reciprocation 
Cialdini states, “The rule [of reciprocation] says that we should try to repay, in 
kind, what another person has provided us” (2007, p. 17).  That is, if a person is given a 
gift, invited to a party, or given a favor, the receiver is obligated to future repayment of 
those gifts, favors, and invitations.  He considers reciprocation one of the most potent of 
the six principles of influence, and even goes so far as to say that this rule is universal to 
all human societies—a statement based on extensive study by sociologists.  Furthermore, 
those that do not adhere to the strict code of reciprocation are negatively viewed by 
society.  
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Noted archaeologists and cultural anthropologists, such as Richard Leakey, Lionel 
Tiger, and Robin Fox, consider the human system of reciprocity vital to the development 
of modern human civilization (Cialdini, 2007, p. 18).  This system allowed early cultures 
to trade and share items and services with the understanding that they would receive 
future compensation.  This eventually developed into complex modern systems of trade 
and currency fundamentally based on the idea that something given would be return in 
kind.  Thus, it is not surprising that reciprocation is deeply embedded in the human 
psyche.  To illustrate this point, Cialdini uses the example of relief aid given to Mexico 
by poverty-stricken Ethiopia.  In this example, Ethiopia provided five thousand dollars in 
aid money to Mexico due to a 1985 earthquake. Although Ethiopia did not have enough 
money to provide even basic needs to its people, the government felt obligated to give aid 
to Mexico based on assistance given by Mexico in 1935.  This particular example is 
indicative of the power of reciprocation because the government of Ethiopia placed the 
need to follow this principle over its own self-interest.  It also demonstrates the 
principle’s application to organizations and governments (Cialdini, 2007, p. 19). 
Cialdini frequently references a study by Professor Dennis Regan in order to 
emphasize the overpowering nature of the rule of reciprocity.  This study found that 
while liking the requester impacts the decision to comply with the request, the 
relationship between liking and compliance is not a factor when reciprocation is 
involved.  Dr. Regan found that when a subject is given a favor by the requester, the 
relative likability of the requester had no impact on the subject’s compliance with the 
request.  This illustrates that the rule of reciprocity is so strong that it can overpower a 
factor that normally elicits compliance (Cialdini, 2007).  This conclusion is pivotal to the 
understanding of the power of reciprocation in that the target of compliance can be made 
to perform an action that he would not normally do by providing a small favor, despite an 
aversion towards the requester.   
Cialdini presents several examples of the application of reciprocation in the realm 
of politics.  He demonstrates that reciprocation is a common method of gaining 
compliance on groups and individuals.  He specifically cites Lyndon Johnson’s ability to 
push his programs through Congress during the early years of his administration.  Close 
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examination has shown that this was not due to his political savvy, but to the favors he 
had given as a representative in both the House and the Senate, a practice called 
“logrolling.”  He was able to call in favors that he had provided prior to his ascension to 
the presidency.  Another example of the principle in the political realm is that of grass-
roots political campaigns.  Local political organizations have learned to provide a wide 
range of small favors to gain compliance (Cialdini, 2007, pp. 24-27). 
Another aspect of the rule is that it can create uninvited debts.  This means that 
even uninvited favors—even extremely small or useless favors—can trigger the 
reciprocation response in an individual.  In this way, the obligation to repay a favor 
inhibits the ability to choose one’s debts towards an individual or group.  The Regan 
study illustrates this point by demonstrating that uninvited favors place all of the free 
choice in the hands of the requester.  This is due to the fact that a) the target will not 
refuse the uninvited favor and b) the uninvited favor produces a sense of indebtedness 
despite the target’s reluctance to initially receive the favor.  The same study also found 
that the rule can also produce unfair exchanges.  That is, the requester may ask for a favor 
from the target that is disproportionate to the initial favor, and the target will be inclined 
to repay the perceived debt (Cialdini, 2007, pp. 30-33). 
Cialdini also demonstrates another aspect to the rule of reciprocation: reciprocal 
concessions.  This aspect of the rule adds that there is an “obligation to make a 
concession to someone who has made a concession to us” (Cialdini, 2007, p. 37).  In 
other words, the requester can gain a favor from the target by conceding to a smaller 
request than the one initially made.  He further states that mutual concession is produced 
by reciprocation in two ways.  First, the rule pressures the recipient of a concession to 
respond with one of his own.  Second, reciprocating a concession creates desirable 
arrangements by ensuring that the initiator of the arrangement will not be exploited.  
Otherwise, members of a society would never be inclined to concede to anything, since 
they would not have a reasonable expectation of reciprocation.  This rule can even 
produce compliance with large requests, given that the initial request was extreme. 
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2. Commitment and Consistency 
The principles of commitment and consistency are treated as one concept in 
Influence because the two concepts are interrelated.  The principle is that humans desire 
to be consistent with past choices, and, given those choices, will encounter both external 
and personal pressures to act in accordance with that commitment.  These pressures can 
justify a previous decision that one would not have normally made—a decision that could 
even be against one’s own self interest.  Cialdini goes on to say that the need for 
consistency is often a response to the desire to believe the person seeking compliance and 
that it can shield against thinking about the decision.  This fact can be exploited by those 
that would prefer to limit thought in their request for compliance.  The human tendency 
toward consistency is a powerful tool to those that would choose to exploit it. 
The need for consistency is fueled by the aspect of commitment.  If the exploiter 
can receive an initial commitment from the target, the rule of consistency activates, and 
the target is inclined to adhere to the initial commitment.  Even a seemingly innocent 
request for a response can register as a commitment in the target’s mind.  Cialdini 
demonstrates this response by explaining a technique used by charity telemarketers.  The 
solicitor begins the pitch with a benign inquiry as to the person’s well-being.  This simple 
question is designed to produce a simple response such as, “Just fine” or “Good.” Once 
the target has stated that he is well, it is easier to induce the target to come to the aid of 
those who are not “Just fine.”  While this type of answer seems to be a normal response 
to a superficial query about one’s welfare, it is in fact an attempt to get the target to 
commit to his relative good fortune (Cialdini, 2007, p. 67-69). 
This principle of commitment and consistency can even override one’s desire to 
do what is right.  A striking example of this is the prisoner-of-war program run by the 
Chinese during the Korean War.  Instead of torture or brutality to produce responses to 
their questions, the Chinese employed the weapons of commitment and consistency to get 
results.  Their tactic was to begin with requesting small concessions from American 
POWs in order to establish a commitment and gradually increase the demands.  By 
starting with requesting statements such as “The United States in not perfect,” the 
Chinese garnered more substantial statements from POWs as time progressed.  
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Eventually, POWs found themselves signing written statements listing the problems with 
America, which were subsequently broadcast by the Chinese.  American POWs 
essentially became collaborators with the enemy without even realizing it due to the 
principles of commitment and consistency. 
This principle becomes even more powerful when the commitment is both written 
and publicized.  In the POW example, the Chinese would hold political essay contests 
with small prizes such as food items or cigarettes.  The winning essays were often pro-
American as a whole, but with small concessions to Communism.  Thus, the Chinese 
were able produce small, voluntary concessions in written form from American POWs, 
which would provide the needed foundation for stronger statements in the future.  
Additionally, the Chinese would publicize the winning essays in order to make the 
commitment visible to others in the camp.  This action provoked a drive to sustain the 
commitment of the POW in order to maintain the appearance of consistency.  
While commitments seem to be most effective in altering behavior when they 
require action, publicity, and effort, it is target’s perception that the commitment was his 
choice that is more important than the other reasons.  Cialdini states that social scientists 
have determined that one accepts responsibility for certain behavior when he thinks the 
choice was his without strong outside pressures.  This explains why the Chinese would 
offer small prizes such as cigarettes to the winners of essay contests: they wanted to 
prevent any excuses from the POWs for their ultimate actions of compliance. 
Cialdini applies the principle to the group dynamic by citing the initiation rituals 
of the Thonga tribe in southern Africa.  The youths of this tribe are made to endure 
elaborate and painful initiation rituals in order to be accepted into the tribe as men.  This 
example illustrates the fact that the more effort that is given in making a commitment, the 
more likely one who makes the commitment is susceptible to influence (Cialdini, 2007). 
The principle of commitment and consistency is extremely attractive to those 
seeking compliance due to the minimal effort required to alter behavior.  Commitments 
induce a change that is not necessarily specific to initial situation and the effects are  
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enduring.  Additionally, once the seed of commitment is planted in the individual, there is 
no need to exert an effort to maintain that commitment—the rule of consistency takes 
over. 
3. Social Proof 
Social proof is the tendency to determine correct behavior by observing what is 
considered correct by other people.  A particular action is perceived as more appropriate 
when others are also behaving in the same manner.  This aspect of social proof is a 
double-edged sword.  While it provides a guideline for acceptable social behavior, it also 
presents a vulnerably by which one seeking compliance can gain an advantage.  The 
nature of social proof renders a reflexive response that is easily fooled by false evidence. 
The power of social proof is such that adherence to a certain behavior or belief 
can endure, even in the face of overwhelming evidence contrary to that belief.  A 
poignant example of this characteristic is provided in When Prophecy Fails—the study of 
a doomsday cult conducted by Leon Festinger, Henry Riecken, and Stanley Schachter.  In 
this study, the authors observed that the cult’s followers maintained their faith even after 
the doomsday prophecy was undeniably refuted.  The cult members were actually more 
fervent in their beliefs than before the blatant evidence against those beliefs.  The 
researchers used the study to formulate conditions under which such a disaffirmation of 
belief can actually induce increased adherence to those beliefs.  One of these conditions 
is social support.  The authors state that if a believer is a member of a group who can 
support each other in these erroneous beliefs, then the members of the group are likely to 
adhere to these beliefs despite contrary evidence (Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 
1956). 
The above example illustrates that the principle of social proof is enhanced by 
uncertainty and ambiguity.  In such situations, there is a tendency to follow the lead of 
others.  This tendency leads to a concept vital to the understanding of social proof: 
“pluralistic ignorance.”  Pluralistic ignorance explains the phenomenon of the refusal of 
any one person in a group of bystanders to come to aid of someone in need. Cialdini 
states that the reason for this is twofold.  The first reason is that in the presence of several 
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potential helpers, the responsibility of any one person is reduced.  Since everyone in the 
group comes to the same conclusion, no one in particular provides the needed help.  The 
second reason is that the emergency is often not an emergency, and responding to such a 
situation may be more than is required.  This ambiguity is then reinforced by the inaction 
of other bystanders (Cialdini, 2007, pp. 129-133). 
Uncertainty can also be an advantage to those seeking compliance in a particular 
situation or environment.  The person who recognizes the nature of social proof can 
provide direction to his benefit in the face of ambiguity.  When an uncertain situation 
occurs, the one who can provide direction can elicit a response in one seeking certainty.  
Once this is accomplished, the principle of social proof reestablishes itself, but to the 
advantage of the one providing direction. 
Other than uncertainty, the other condition under which social proof is 
particularly powerful is similarity.  Social proof gains additional power when the group 
exhibiting a particular behavior is similar to those looking to the group for direction.  
Cialdini illustrates this behavior with a study conducted by David Phillips, a sociologist 
at the University of California in San Diego.  Phillips examined suicide statistics over the 
course of twenty-one years, and found that within two months after front-page suicide 
story, an average of fifty-eight more people killed themselves than usual.  Phillips also 
found that this statistical tendency occurred primarily in the regions of the country where 
the story was publicized.  In essence, the act of one person committing suicide in a 
particular region resulted in an average of fifty-eight additional “copycat” suicides.  One 
person committing such an act has the effect of validating such behavior in other people 
with a particular characteristic.  
4. Liking 
Liking is the principle that one is more inclined to comply with a request when 
they like the one seeking compliance.  This principle applies not only to those who are 
familiar, but also to complete strangers.  Companies such as Tupperware use the liking 
principle to sell their products by creating situations where the target buys items in the 
home of a friend.  This creates a feeling of obligation to the host of the party who 
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receives a portion of the profits of each sale.  The target then equates turning down the 
offer to buy the product to turning down the friend.  This aspect of the principle also 
applies to referral offers.  The company soliciting business from the target can merely use 
the name of the friend who referred the product, and the same obligatory situation is 
created.  The real power of the principle, however, is demonstrated in situations wherein 
there is no established relationship prior to the sales pitch. 
Cialdini states that a compliance professional’s strategy often starts with one goal: 
to get the target to like them.  He goes on to say that the key to understanding the 
principle is to understand the factors that lead to liking a person.  Research accumulated 
by social scientists has identified five aspects which reliably lead to liking: physical 
attractiveness, similarity, compliments, contact and cooperation, and conditioning and 
association (Cialdini, 2007, pp. 171-204). 
Cialdini states that the general knowledge that attractive people have an 
advantage in social situations is greatly underestimated.  Research has shown that 
attractive people are automatically assigned positive traits, and that these judgments are 
made without being aware that attractiveness plays a role in assigning these traits.  This 
phenomenon has been demonstrated in electing political candidates and hiring job 
applicants.  Good-looking people received more favorable outcomes, and the voters and 
interviewers denied such a bias.  This goes even further in the justice system where 
statistics show that attractive defendants received lighter sentences in criminal trials.  
Even children who act out are viewed as less “naughty” if the child is attractive. In 
general, good-looking people are better liked, more persuasive, more frequently helped, 
and seen as having better personality traits than those who are not attractive (Cialdini, 
2007, p. 172). 
Similarity is another aspect that leads to liking a person.  People generally like 
those who are similar to them, whether in personality, opinions, lifestyle, or background, 
and those seeking compliance utilize many methods in order to appear similar to the 
target.  For example, if the requester is dressed in a similar fashion as the target, they are 
more likely to get a favorable response.  This has been demonstrated in studies involving 
simple requests from strangers and getting signatures for a petition.  Another method is to 
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claim to have a similar background as the target in order to manipulate compliance.  Car 
salesmen are trained to look for items in the buyer’s trade-in for items that can be used to 
fabricate similarity (i.e., golf clubs, camping gear, or an out-of-state license plate).  The 
salesman can then make casual remarks that indicate interest in those hobbies or places.  
Salespeople are even trained in “mirror and match” where they mimic the customer’s 
body language and verbal style to illicit a sense of similarity (Cialdini, 2007, pp. 173-
174).   
A simple compliment is effective because it invokes a sense that the target is 
liked.  This flattery can even be completely false and still produce the desired response. A 
study done in North Carolina involved men receiving comments about themselves from a 
person needing a favor.  These comments were good, bad, or a mixture of the two. The 
study demonstrated that: 1) the person who only provided praise was liked best by the 
subjects; 2) this was true even though the subjects were fully aware that the evaluators 
were in need of a favor; and 3) the praise did not have to be true in order to get a positive 
response (Cialdini, 2007, p. 176). 
Another aspect of the liking principle is that of contact.  This is demonstrated in a 
study in which subjects were exposed to rapid images of different faces, and where some 
of the faces were shown more than others.  The subjects then met the people associated 
with those images in person, and were more inclined to the like the ones whose face was 
shown more often and more readily agreed to their opinions.  It would seem that having 
more frequent contact would increase the chances of liking a person, but the contact must 
occur in a favorable or pleasant setting. 
In order to demonstrate this, Cialdini uses the example of school integration. 
While the purpose of integration was to improve race relations by exposing children of 
different races to each other, it actually degraded relations between races because of the 
setting.  The competitive and frustrating nature of the school setting resulted in 
associating contact with different races with an unpleasant setting, and degraded, rather 
than improved, race relations.  The solution to this problem lies in cooperation. By 
creating situations where the children had to work together toward a common goal, 
interracial relations were improved.  This aspect of liking is used to produce a sense of 
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alliance between the target and the one seeking compliance.  Cialdini equates this tactic 
with the “Good Cop/Bad Cop” routine in which one of the interrogators acts as an “ally” 
with the suspect against the other, more aggressive interrogator.  The same principle 
applies to the salesman who is offering a good deal that his boss would not condone, 
fostering a sense of “us against them.” 
Those seeking compliance attempt to influence the target’s decision making by 
associating the product (or themselves) with positive ideas and images. This is 
demonstrated in advertising by invoking the “official sponsor” moniker so often used in 
conjunction with sporting events such as the Olympics.  People then associate the product 
with something they like, which makes them more inclined to purchase that product.  The 
logic of the association is irrelevant—it only has to be a positive one. Politicians employ 
this principle by associating themselves with likable personalities and celebrities, as well 
as positive ideas such as family and values.  Thus, they are able to gain likability through 
their association with other likable things. 
Cialdini illustrates the power of association with the phenomenon of home team 
loyalty.  The association is so strong that people often define themselves (at least 
partially) by the success or failure of their team.  Team success leads to a feeling of 
personal superiority, even though the fan did not directly participate in the event. People 
then manipulate the visibility of this association according to the team’s success or failure 
in order to increase their likability (Cialdini, 2007). 
5. Authority 
Cialdini begins his discussion of the principle of authority by discussing the 
classic study conducted by Professor Stanley Milgram.  The study involved placing the 
subjects in the position to deliver painful electric shocks to another person based on their 
ability to answer a set of questions.  While the shocks were not real, the “victim” made 
increasingly loud screams and pleas as the voltage increased.  The experiment found that 




experimenter ended the study.  Despite the victims’ pleas for release, they continued to 
shock the victim until told to stop.  These disturbing results show the powerful effect of 
an authority figure on compliance. 
The Milgram study demonstrated that without the researcher’s direction to 
continue to shock the victim, the study would have ended sooner.  The subjects clearly 
agonized over the pain they gave to the victim in the experiment, but continued to do so 
despite their own pleas to stop.  Several versions of the study were conducted after the 
initial findings, and the power of authority was confirmed in every instance.  Thomas 
Blass’ perspective on the Milgram experiment, Obedience to Authority, expands upon the 
study and applies it to a socio-political arena.  He describes the power of authority in 
Nazi Germany’s conduct of the Holocaust.  The principle of authority influenced many 
members of the Germany military to commit atrocities that they never would have done 
without authoritative direction.  This, in fact, was major motivation for Milgram to 
conduct a study of authority (Blass, 2000, p. 4). 
Cialdini explains that the principle of authority is advantageous to a well-ordered 
human society—allowing for social order, defense, and trade that would be otherwise 
ineffective.  Submission to authority is ingrained on the human psyche from early 
childhood.  From parents, teachers, and religious figures, people are taught to obey 
rightful authority.  Unfortunately, this often results in blind obedience to authority figures 
as a matter of convenience.  While this obedience is generally rewarding to the 
individual, in rare cases, it can be detrimental.   
Not only can real authority illicit an automatic compliance to a request, but also 
the mere appearance of authority.  Obedience to appearance alone leaves people open to 
manipulation by those seeking to exploit it (such as con artists).  Cialdini presents three 
distinct “symbols” that are used to gain compliance by conveying authority: titles, 
clothes, and trappings. 
A title, whether false or genuine, has the effect of producing compliance in 
individuals without regard to the person behind that title.  The knowledge that the person 
has a title to his name can instantly change the nature and manner of a conversation, 
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making the target more susceptible to requests.  Clothing is also used to convey authority.  
Whether it is a uniform or a well-tailored business suit, clothing can easily be used to 
gain compliance through authority.  This is also one of the simplest methods used by con 
men to convey authority.  Trappings are the material goods that suggest status and 
position.  Items such as expensive cars and jewelry can produce deference to the person 
possessing these items, without any knowledge of the individual.   
6. Scarcity 
The principle of scarcity states that if something is rare or becoming rare, then it 
is more valuable.  Cialdini offers as evidence that the idea of potential loss is important in 
human decision making.  “People seem to be more motivated by the thought of losing 
something than by the thought of gaining something of equal value” (Cialdini, 2007, p. 
238).  He presents the example of Mormon temples opening their doors to the general 
public for several days a year.  This event creates interest in the religion by employing 
scarcity to make the idea of a tour of a Mormon temple more valuable. 
This tactic is heavily used by the retail industry which uses limited-time sales and 
“limited inventory” to generate interest in the product or store.  Whether the information 
is actually true is irrelevant; if the consumer sees the item or lower price as scarce, then 
the value of the item increases in the consumer’s mind.  Some high-pressure salesmen 
even use the “right now” tactic, which forces the consumer to make a decision or risk 
losing a low price or the item’s availability.  The basis of this information may be false, 
but it forces a decision and makes the item seem scarce. 
Cialdini asserts that the power of the scarcity comes from two major sources: 1) it 
relies on the human weakness for shortcuts, and 2) peoples’ desire to preserve their 
freedoms, and the loss of an opportunity equates to the loss of a freedom.  A simple 
example of the second source is the rebellious teenager. In this case, because the parent 
forbids a particular act or object, the teenager will see it as more valuable and will likely 
defy the parent.  This even includes romantic relationships.  People are generally unaware 
that the scarcity principle is cause for the desire for the item or person, and to justify the 
desire of that item, they assign positive qualities to it. 
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An important aspect of scarcity is that it extends beyond material goods to the 
realm of ideas and information.  Not only do humans desire censored information more, 
but they are even more inclined to believe the information.  This phenomenon can be 
easily exploited by someone seeking compliance by getting his message officially 
censored in order to increase its perceived value.  The desire to possess censored or 
banned information (and to assign a higher value to the information itself) extends into 
the court system as well.  A piece of evidence that the jury has been instructed to 
disregard in their decision process will actually appear more valuable (and correct), 
which is in contradiction to the purpose of striking a piece of evidence from a trial.  
Another aspect of scarcity is the idea of “newly experienced” scarcity.  This is the 
idea that something that becomes scarce after a period of abundance is actually more 
valuable that something that is always scarce.  Cialdini states that this part of the 
principle is a major cause of political violence.  James C. Davies argues that revolution is 
more likely in times of economic and social turmoil immediately following a period of 
relative improvements.  This is consistent with Karl Marx’s notion of the “crisis of rising 
expectations.”  His examples include the French, Russian, and Egyptian Revolutions and 
the American Civil War.  Once particular freedoms are established by a government, it is 
more detrimental to take those away than to have never offered the freedoms at all.   
The final aspect of the scarcity principle is that of demand, which highlights the 
importance of competition.  An item is essentially more valuable if there is competition 
for its limited numbers.  This is the source of such retail tactics as “popular demand” or 
post-Thanksgiving Day sales.  It is often used in the real estate business wherein an 
indecisive buyer is informed of another “interested party.”  While this party is completely 
fictional, the idea of a potential rival increases the value of the house in the buyer’s eyes.  
The buyer will often come to regret the decision, but competition for a scarce resource 
was the driving factor in the decision making process. 
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III. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF 
INSURGENCIES 
A. DEFINING INSURGENCY 
The problem with defining the term “insurgency” is that there is no universally 
agreed upon definition in the political, academy, or military communities.  The various 
definitions often focus on either the political or military aspects depending on the needs 
or biases of the organization or individual.  While defining insurgency is not the purpose 
of this thesis, a working definition is needed in order to provide a validation of the 
studied cases. 
The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP 1-02) defines 
insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrown of a constituted 
government through the use of subversion and armed conflict” (2004).  This definition 
naturally focuses on the military aspect of insurgencies, but does not mention the political 
aspects of insurgency.  On the other hand, in his book Insurgency and Terrorism: From 
Revolution to Apocalypse, Bard O’Neill defines insurgency as:  
A struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which 
the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., 
organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to 
destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more 
aspects of politics. (as cited in Kendall, 2008, p. 9) 
This particular definition emphasizes the political nature of insurgency, and only 
references violence as opposed to any formal military structure or campaign.  While both 
of these definitions capture certain aspects of insurgency, neither fully capture its nature 
or underlying causes. 
In her thesis, A Unified General Framework of Insurgency Using a Living 
Systems Approach, Shanece L. Kendall seeks to provide a clear and precise definition of 
insurgency.  She argues that the most complete definition is offered by R. Scott Moore in 
his work, The Basics of Counterinsurgency, where he states: 
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An insurgency is a protracted violent conflict in which one or more groups 
seek to overthrow or fundamentally change the political or social order in 
a state or region through the use of sustained violence, subversion, social 
disruption, and political action. (as cited in Kendall, 2008, p. 15) 
Kendall argues that this definition captures the violent, political, and social aspects of 
insurgency (2008, p. 15).  Due to its complete nature, Moore’s definition will be used to 
describe insurgencies in this study. 
B. THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION: THE BOLSHEVIKS RISE TO POWER 
1. Background 
The Bolsheviks were a faction of the Marxist Russian Social Democratic Labour 
Party (RSDLP) that split with the Mensheviks in 1903 and eventually formed the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  The Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin, incited 
the October Revolution phase of the Russian Revolution of 1917, resulting in the party 
seizing power and forming the Soviet Union.  Although the Bolsheviks’ hold on power 
was not fully established until the end of the Russian Civil War in 1923, their actions 
signaled the arrival of Communism as a major form of government. 
The division of the RSDLP occurred due to a fundamental disagreement among 
members of the party.  Those who supported Lenin (the Bolsheviks) believed in a more 
centralized organization in which the general members of the party were subordinate to 
the central leadership.  On the other side, those who supported Julius Martov (the 
Mensheviks) believed that a loose organizational structure was necessary.  Over the next 
two years, Lenin would consolidate his power and influence, and the Bolshevik 
organization was in place.  This organization consisted of professional revolutionaries 
with personal loyalty to Lenin, who believed that they represented the interests of the 
proletariat (Pipes, 1990). 
The Bolsheviks did not exert much influence during the 1905 Russian Revolution, 
which caught party leaders by surprise.  During this revolution, the party generally 
limited themselves to proclamations and inciting unrest, but it had little control over the 
events of the revolution.  During this time, Lenin remained outside of the country, and 
directed party operations from Switzerland.  Although the Bolsheviks were largely absent 
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from the actions of the revolution, it marked the beginning of Bolshevik terrorist attacks 
and assassinations.  The revolution ended in 1907, when the Tsar agreed to allow certain 
civil liberties, the formation of the Duma, and the legalization of some political parties 
(Pipes, 1990). 
Following the 1905 revolution, various splits occurred within the Bolshevik 
organization, which led to an attempt at party unity in 1910.  The attempt was a failure, 
and the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks cut off all relations by 1912, when the Bolsheviks 
officially declared themselves a separate party.  Meanwhile, Lenin was in exile, travelling 
Europe and participating in socialist meetings and events.  
Russia’s defeat in World War I ultimately sealed the fate of tsarist regime.  As the 
war progressed, discontent within the ranks of the army became difficult to control.  
Additionally, with food and resources being used to support the war effort, shortages 
began to occur in the cities of Russia, which led to severe inflation.  This severe 
economic crisis caused revolutionary thinking to occur even in the upper class of Russia.  
The crisis, along with a harsh winter and general discontent with the regime, eventually 
led to the February Revolution of 1917 (Pipes, 1990). 
The February Revolution was, by all accounts, a spontaneous popular uprising.  
The revolution was centered in the city of Petrograd, where workers began striking and 
protesting.  These protests led to general protests demanding food and the eventual 
shutdown of Petrograd’s industrial enterprises.  The protests quickly spread to the white 
collar workers and academics, and numerous clashes with police occurred.  The tsar sent 
the military to deal with the violence, but many of the soldiers deserted and joined the 
protests.  With the addition of armed soldiers, the sporadic violence escalated to an armed 
revolt, and by March 22, the royal family was deposed and a Provisional Government 
was in place (Pipes, 1990). 
The Provisional Government was initially greeted with enthusiasm and 
excitement.  Within two months, however, discontent soon surfaced between the new 
government and the socialist factions in Russia, including the Bolsheviks.  The anemic 
economy and the Provisional Government’s decision to continue Russian involvement in 
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World War I eventually led to rioting in July 1917.  This brief period of violence, known 
as the July Days, was led by the Bolsheviks.  The riots were suppressed after several days 
of violence, and the Provisional Government called for the arrest of Bolshevik leaders, 
who were forced to go into hiding (Pipes, 1990). 
In early October 1917, the Bolshevik Central Committee concluded that the time 
was ripe for an armed uprising to overthrow the weak Provisional Government.  The 
coup was relatively quick, and little blood was shed.  The Bolsheviks quickly seized the 
major government facilities with little opposition, and conducted an assault on the Winter 
Palace on the night of 25 October.  The well-timed coup resulted in Bolshevik control of 
the capital city of Petrograd within three days of insurrection, and state power was 
handed over to the Congress of Soviets (Pipes, 1990). 
Following the October Revolution, the Congress of Soviets—mostly comprised of 
Bolsheviks and other Socialist Revolutionaries—quickly instituted their socialist agenda, 
seizing control of all banks, factories, and religious properties.  The Soviets did not enjoy 
immediate acceptance as the rightful ruling government in Russia.  Many factions began 
to gather on the periphery to oppose the Bolsheviks.  Former tsarist generals rallied the 
anti-Bolshevik soldiers to form the White Armies (DeFronzo, 1991, p.44).  These White 
Armies provided the strongest resistance to the Bolshevik Red Army. 
The White Armies enjoyed support from both internal and external anti-Bolshevik 
entities, including the United States and Great Britain.  The Red Army, however, had 
many more resources at its disposal, and it grew to a formidable force.  The White 
Armies were also a disorganized force, with their various factions operating 
autonomously.  Additionally, the Whites never enjoyed popular support from the working 
or peasant classes of Russia, due to their opposition to Bolshevik policies that benefitted 
the lower classes.  The lack of central organization and popular support led to the 
complete defeat of the White Armies by 1923 (DeFronzo, 1991, p. 45). 
Following the death of Lenin in 1924, various Bolshevik leaders struggled for 
control of the revolution.  Trotsky and Stalin were the primary contenders, and they 
agreed on many important points.  They disagreed, however, on leadership and policy 
 23
direction within the Communist Party, as well as the role that the party would take in 
fomenting socialist revolutions outside of Russia.  Eventually, the supporters of Stalin 
won, Trotsky was expelled from the Soviet Union in 1929, and Stalin assumed dictatorial 
control of the country.   
2. The Role of Reciprocation 
As with the Cuban revolution, the leaders of Bolsheviks utilized the principle of 
reciprocation in the form of promises made to the workers and peasants of Russia.  This 
was important for the party in order to gain support from the peasant population, who 
generally supported the Social Revolutionaries.  Although the party received a great deal 
of support from the working class, it was more difficult for the Bolsheviks to gain a 
foothold in the rural peasant community.  In order to remedy this situation, they promised 
the peasantry a share of lands owned by the rich and the Church.  Lenin felt that by 
offering land as incentive, the peasants would overwhelmingly support the Bolshevik 
coup (DeFronzo, 1991).  This theory was validated during the Russian Civil War in 
which the peasants overwhelmingly supported the Red Army. 
Richard Pipes, in his book The Russian Revolution, describes Lenin’s use of the 
principle of reciprocation.  He states that Lenin specifically sought ways to identify and 
exploit sources of discontent to promote revolution.  Lenin realized that the disregard 
other revolutionary groups had for the peasantry was a flawed view.  He identified the 
peasantry as a vital source of support for any revolution, and proposed the idea of ceding 
all lands in the rural areas to the peasants.  This idea was instrumental in gaining support 
for the Bolsheviks over other groups following the October Revolution (Pipes, 1990). 
3. The Role of Authority 
Authority was a powerful factor in the Bolsheviks’ gaining influence among the 
people of Russia.  This was especially true within the party’s organization.  Despite 
arguments and rifts between members and factions within the party, the general direction 
of the Bolsheviks remained true to Lenin’s vision.  Lenin was the party.  He was its 
creator and its driving force.  The authority that Lenin held over the other members of the 
party was undeniable, and he used this authority to bend the party members to his will.  
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Following the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power, this authority was especially evident in the 
events of the Red Terror.  Despite the many objections of party members to state-
sponsored terrorism, Lenin’s insistence for such a policy led to actions that party 
members would not have otherwise conducted (Pipes, 1990). 
The Bolshevik movement was basically held together by one man, Lenin.  Pipes 
states that without Lenin, there was nothing else to hold together the various factions of 
the party at the time of the October Revolution.  The authority of Lenin was so powerful 
that his successors built a quasi-religious cult around his legend.  Lenin’s name was often 
evoked by future party leaders to lend authority to the Bolsheviks, even after the party 
was firmly in control of the country.  The authority of his mystique was often more 
powerful than that of the man himself (Pipes, 1990).  
The Bolsheviks were touted as the party that represented the interests of the 
common Russian worker, but they still recognized that authority was necessary to get the 
respect of those workers that they were representing.  Lenin believed that an 
organizational structure with a strong central authority was essential to success of the 
party.  He viewed the party as an “organizational weapon” with a central focus of gaining 
power (Gleason, Kenez, & Stites, 1985).  In keeping with the strong central core of the 
party, Lenin attracted sympathetic scholars and politicians to the Bolshevik Party.  These 
were respected men with authority attached to their positions in society.  He believed that 
while the party should represent the common man, he did not want the common man to 
help lead the party. 
Following the takeover by the Bolshevik Party, the opposing White Armies also 
used authority in order to gain influence.  According to George Stewart, in his book The 
White Armies of Russia, the leaders of the White Armies were generally the authority 
figures of tsarist Russia.  These men included military officers, nobility, Church leaders, 
and landowners.  In many of the rural areas of Russia, these figures still held vast 
influence over the peasantry due to their residual authority, and many peasants followed 
them out of past loyalty (Stewart, 1970, p. 23). 
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Authority for the Whites also derived from the institution of the Tsar of Russia.  
Although the Tsar was out of favor in the major cities of European Russia, the authority 
of his office was still powerful in the rural areas.  They had yet to experience the massive 
uprisings of Soviets that the cities had, and the leadership of the White took advantage of 
that by using the Tsar’s authority to enlist the peasantry (Stewart, 1970, p. 23).  This was 
also one of the reasons the Reds felt it necessary to execute the Tsar—and his family. 
The White Armies also used the support of Allies to establish authority.  This was 
especially true in South Russia where Allied weapons and munitions strengthened the 
authority of the White Armies in the South.  The support of the Allies provided the 
Whites with a source of authority in the international community.  This was vital to their 
cause, since they did not control many sources of armament and relied on outside aid to 
get weaponry (Lincoln, 1989, p. 198). 
4. The Role of Liking 
The principle of liking was also an important factor in the influence of the 
Bolsheviks and Lenin, mostly through the aspect of association.  Similarity was not as 
important a factor in the influence of the central leadership on the population, as the 
leaders of the party were not of the same socio-economic class.  On the other hand, 
similarity became a factor as the members of the working class began supporting the 
party, which influenced their peers to do the same.  It was the party’s association with the 
interests of the working class, however, that had the most powerful effect on the support 
of the population. 
One association that was particularly effective for the party was its anti-war 
position.  Russia’s involvement in World War I was becoming an increasingly 
contentious issue with both the workers and peasants of the country.  It was a drain on the 
fragile economy, and many Russians were killed in the war.  The Bolsheviks were 
strongly opposed to the war, and their association with the anti-war position was 
attractive to the population (DeFronzo, 1991). 
The principle of liking was also a major factor in Lenin’s influence with the party 
members and the population.  According to Pipes, the primary source of his appeal to the 
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party was his complete identification with the cause itself.  To Lenin, his person and the 
socialist cause were one in the same.  This was not merely a perception that he desired to 
project, he firmly believed in this assertion.  This made him extremely popular in socialist 
circles, but also translated into an uncompromising morality where grey areas did not 
exist.  While he was well-liked by those that supported the Bolsheviks, he was a 
dangerous enemy to those who did not (Pipes, 1990). 
The black-and-white viewpoint exhibited by Lenin further increased his likability 
to fellow socialists through his loyalty to those he considered friends.  He was actually 
quite tolerant of opposing viewpoints within his own circle of followers, which endeared 
him to those in the party.  The same good-versus-evil outlook also resulted in Lenin’s 
own brand of modesty.  Lenin never encouraged blind devotion to himself as a leader—
only support of Lenin’s being one with the proletariat.  His modesty was another 
attractive aspect that encouraged his likability (Pipes, 1990). 
Lenin’s persona appealed to the population in addition to the leaders of the party.  
Lenin never deviated from his position as the champion of the proletariat.  His public 
statements always included rhetoric concerning the repression of the common worker and 
the need for socialist reform.  Although he was not a member of the proletariat, his 
complete association with the workers’ well-being effectively made him one with the 
workers (Trotsky, 1959).   
5. The Role of Social Proof 
With the multitude of rival factions, an unstable government, and a crippled 
economy, the Russian population was faced with a great deal of uncertainty.  This 
provided an ideal atmosphere for the influence of the social proof principle.  The people 
needed direction, and they often looked to their peers within their socio-economic class 
for guidance.  Uncertainty also affected the pseudo-intellectuals and displaced peasants of 
Russia, and the Bolsheviks provided an answer to the country’s ambiguity.  According to 
Pipes, Lenin’s party gave the people a sense of belonging and cohesion in a chaotic 
country (Pipes, 1990). 
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Social proof was also a factor in party fundraising.  It was very popular for the 
social elite to contribute some of their wealth to social revolutionary causes.  These 
contributions were not given out of support for the revolutionaries, but out of social 
pressure from those in their own economic class.  The cause of the Bolsheviks was 
completely detrimental to their lifestyle and livelihood, but they contributed out pressure 
to conform to their social circles (Pipes, 1990). 
6. Other Uses of the Principles of Influence 
The principle of commitment and consistency was also at work within the 
leadership of the Bolsheviks.  There was no question that Lenin was the epitome of 
commitment to the socialist cause.  Lenin completely internalized his commitment and 
never wavered from the goal of a socialist Russia.  It was through consistency to that 
commitment that he often performed very cruel and brutal acts.  There was never a hint 
of remorse from Lenin when he would condone terror or condemn a man to death.  These 
things were merely a means to an end, and he never bothered with the morality of such 
acts (Pipes, 1990).  It was this commitment, however, that allowed the Red Armies to 
unite under a single banner.  The single-minded commitment to the cause of the 
Revolution reverberated throughout the ranks of the Reds, and produced a unified front 
against the White Armies (Lincoln, 1989, p. 199). 
Commitment and consistency also played a role in the influence that Lenin had 
over the other members of the party.  In the period between the February Revolution and 
the October Revolution, there was much debate and strife among the members of the 
Bolshevik Party.  Many had begun to lose faith in Lenin, due to his unyielding stance on 
the direction of the Revolution.  His core supporters, however, never abandoned the 
commitment made to the party and to Lenin.  Following the imprisonment of Trotsky and 
Lenin’s disappearance from the party following the July Days, Stalin took up the mantle 
of leadership and fiercely defended Lenin and his vision for the party (Adams, 1972).  
His commitment helped to hold the Bolsheviks together following the July Days disaster. 
Commitment and consistency were also utilized by the White Armies in the 
Russian Civil War.  Commitment to the Motherland, and to the Tsar, was a common 
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theme in the rhetoric of the White Armies.  This commitment to Russia was a powerful 
motivator for the officers and conscripts in the White Armies.  Unfortunately, that 
commitment often translated only to the local garrisons and pockets of Whites throughout 
the country.  This proved to be a major problem, since the Whites never fully united 
under one banner.  Although the officers and troops were committed to their own units, 
they could not commit to a unified cause (Lincoln, 1989, p. 199). 
 Scarcity played a role in the Bolsheviks’ influence with the workers and peasants 
of Russia.  As with other insurgencies and revolutions, newly experienced scarcity was 
an impetus for a sweeping socialist revolution.  In this case, it was the economic hardship 
experienced by the population during World War I, and the tsar’s inability to alleviate the 
woes of the Russian people.  Although revolutionaries were active within Russia since 
the late 19th century, it took shortages of money and food during the war to push the 
country into revolution.  Lenin, while vehemently opposed to Russia’s involvement in the 
war, recognized the opportunity provided by the hardship experienced during the war 
(DeFronzo, 1991). 
C. MAU MAU UPRISING 
1. Background 
The Mau Mau Uprising was an insurgency against British colonial rule in Kenya 
from 1952-1956.  As with many African nations at this time, colonial rule by the 
European settlers was becoming an increasing point of tension.  The uprising was led 
primarily by the Kikuyu people of the Kenyan highlands.  A history of unfair land 
practices and tenant labor fueled much of the contention between the Kikuyu and the 
European settlers.  While the Kikuyu were allowed a small patch of land on which to 
farm—in exchange for labor—they had no actual rights to that land.  European settlers 
owned most of the desirable farmland, while the Kikuyu were relegated to a relatively 
small “native reserve” (Polk, 2007, pp. 108-109).   
Recognizing the unfair practices enforced by the colonial government, a small 
group of educated Kikuyu formed the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA). The British 
continued to strip away Kikuyu rights, and by 1934, they controlled almost all of the 
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good land in Kenya.  This resulted in severe overcrowding in both the Kikuyu reserve 
and the main cities.  At the outset of World War II, the British outlawed the KCA as a 
wartime “security measure,” and the Kikuyu lost their only peaceful means of addressing 
grievances with the colonial government. The KCA, however, continued operating and 
recruiting in secrecy (Polk, 2007, p. 110). 
The younger, educated Kikuyu began searching for a way to organize a resistance 
movement against colonial rule.  In the absence of such revolutionary catalysts such as 
Communism, nationalism, or religion, they turned to a traditional Kikuyu form of 
association known as “oathing,” a form of commitment that will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
The insurgency—known by the British as the Emergency—began in earnest in 
1952, with most of the fighting taking place between October 1952 and July 1953.  The 
small band of about thirty insurgents had grown to about four thousand under the 
leadership of Waruhiu Itote, known as “General China.”  This group quickly took control 
of the Kikuyu area of Kenya.  The new governor, Sir Evelyn Baring, believed that the 
Mau Mau was a completely illegitimate movement, and that mass arrests were necessary 
to quell the dissenters. He proceeded to apprehend many who turned out to be moderate 
Kikuyu, including Jomo Kenyatta—the leader of the British-sanctioned Kenya African 
Union (KAU).  These moderates were actually working to calm the rebellion, and the 
arrests resulted in a surge of support for the insurgents (Polk, 2007, pp. 115-116). 
With the support for Mau Mau growing in the population, Baring began a massive 
hunt for the insurgents.  His methods of using foreign fighters and brutal tactics alarmed 
both the Kikuyu and the British government.  In response, London sent General George 
Erskine to deal with the Emergency.  He immediately realized that the Mau Mau was 
deeply entrenched in the Kikuyu population, and that brutal tactics would not be 
sufficient to quell the rebellion.  Erskine realized that he needed intelligence on Mau Mau 
in order to find supporters and understand their motives (Polk, 2007, pp. 116-118). 
In 1954, the British managed to capture Itote, and received valuable intelligence 
from him.  Based on this intelligence, the British were able to capture warriors and 
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leaders of the Mau Mau, and separated them from the support population.  They also 
employed “pseudo gangs” to infiltrate the Mau Mau and lead them into ambushes.  This 
method proved highly effective in eliminating Mau Mau members.  The pseudo gangs 
were, however, unable to completely shut down the insurgency, and the British turned to 
the Kikuyu elders and Christians for help.  These groups benefited from British rule, and 
they willingly aided the military in defeating the insurgency.  Still, the uprising 
continued. 
Despite attempts by the British to capture and kill Mau Mau leaders and warriors, 
they were not effective in ending the insurgency.  Baring refused to address the 
underlying issue of unfair land practices, and created “villages” where the natives were 
crammed into small areas.  These were viewed as prison camps by the Kikuyu.  Various 
other efforts, including “counter-oaths” to break the Mau Mau oath, were generally 
ineffective.  Although the insurgents were handily defeated militarily, the settlers failed 
to address the underlying issues that began the uprising.  In 1959, the British began 
dismantling the campaign, and removing the control of the settlers in Kenya.  In 1961, 
Jomo Kenyatta was released from prison to begin building an independent Kenyan 
government that took control in 1963.  With the British gone and Kenya independent, the 
Mau Mau insurgency simple dissolved (Polk, 2007). 
2. The Role of Commitment and Consistency 
While the Mau Mau employed several of Cialdini’s weapons in gaining influence 
in the population, none was more prevalent or effective than commitment and 
consistency.  This insurgency provides a perfect example of the application of the 
principle in order to gain influence and recruit members.  The Mau Mau used the Kikuyu 
tradition of oath taking and used it to gain members and maintain their support.  These 
oaths took advantage of this tradition, along with the superstition surrounding the 
breaking of oaths, to maintain secrecy and fight against the European settlers. 
According to John McConnell in his study of the Mau Mau Uprising, Kikuyu 
oaths were traditionally benign in nature, and were primarily used to affirm allegiance to 
the tribe.  The Mau Mau, however, used oaths to ensure commitment to the insurgency 
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and violence against the settlers (McConnell, 2005, p. 22).  Not only did these oaths 
commit the Kikuyu to the cause of the Mau Mau, they also used the superstitious nature 
of these oaths guarantee consistency in the future.  While Kikuyu nationalism was rooted 
in years of oppression and British injustice, it was oath taking that provided the militant 
nature of the resistance. 
The Mau Mau used oath taking in much the same way that the Chinese 
manipulated the commitment principle in breaking American POWs.  According to the 
Majdalany’s book, State of Emergency, the Mau Mau oath was taken in steps so that the 
first oath taken was relatively benign.  The first oath simply demanded allegiance and 
secrecy from those taking the oath.  These oaths were designed to promote unity of the 
people, and did not demand any violent action of the oath taker.  The unity oath was 
generally taken verbally, and without any accompanying actions.   
An example of the unity oath is as follows: 
• If I ever reveal the secrets of this organization, may this oath kill me. 
• If I ever sell or dispose of any Kikuyu land to a foreigner, may this oath kill 
me. 
• If I ever fail to follow our great leader, Kenyatta, may this oath kill me. 
• If I ever inform against any member of this organization or against any 
member who steals from the European, may this oath kill me. 
• If I ever fail to pay the fees of this organization, may this oath kill me. 
(Majdalany, 1962, pp. 76-77) 
These unity oaths were the first step in gaining compliance from the Kikuyu 
people.  They were able to gain support by forcing a commitment to the Mau Mau 
verbally and in front of their peers.  According to Wunyabari Maloba in his book, Mau 
Mau and Kenya, “[The unity oath] was a recruitment drive, secretly extending political 
consciousness and commitment to the nationalist struggle” (Maloba, 1993, p. 102).  
These oaths also utilized traditional oath-taking symbols, such as eating goat meat, to 
emphasize the seriousness of the promise that was made.  The utilization of symbols 
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reinforces Cialdini’s conclusions that the commitment principle is more powerful when 
the target performs an action in conjunction with making the commitment. 
While most Kikuyu who were given oaths stopped at the first level, the unity oath, 
the Mau Mau warriors were given a second oath, the Batuni oath, to further emphasize 
commitment to the insurgency.  Just as the Chinese demanded stronger commitments 
from the American POWs, the Mau Mau administered stronger oaths to those that would 
be engaging in armed conflict with the Europeans.  The Batuni oath involved many of the 
same commitments made in the unity oath, while adding a violent component to it.  It 
included swearing to kill on behalf of the Mau Mau and to never fear killing Europeans in 
order to win back lost Kikuyu lands.  The actions required to take the Banuti oath were 
far more bizarre and elaborate than the unity oath.  These actions often involved sexual 
symbolism that was deeply rooted in traditional Kikuyu beliefs.  According to Maloba, 
the act of taking the Batuni oath demonstrated a higher sense of commitment to the cause 
(Maloba, 1993, p. 103). 
As the war progressed, and the Mau Mau warriors became more desperate, the 
oaths became more and more exotic.  Maloba states that the fighters turned to extreme 
oaths as a source of courage and dedication.  It was also in response to the pseudo gangs 
used by the British to infiltrate the camps to separate the Mau Mau from the imposters 
(Maloba, 1993).  As they became more desperate, the principle of consistency caused 
them to perform more powerful acts to prove their commitment to the Mau Mau cause.  
Much like the religious cult in Festinger’s study, the hopelessness and uncertainty of a 
losing cause strengthened the members’ commitment to the insurgency. 
3. The Role of Authority 
The Mau Mau’s use of authority was another principle—like commitment and 
consistency—that exploited the superstitious nature of the Kikuyu people.  While 
politicians and activists alone failed to incite the Kikuyu to rebellion, the Mau Mau 
succeeded by becoming a religion unto itself.  The Kikuyu culture was one deeply rooted 
in religious beliefs and, by giving the appearance of religious authority, the insurgency 
was able to influence those that they previously could not. 
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Cialdini demonstrated how people could be influenced by the appearance of 
authority, even when real authority was not present.  He stated that symbols could be 
used to convey this appearance of authority.  These were concepts which the Mau Mau 
used extensively to gain support from the Kikuyu community.  The Mau Mau borrowed 
symbols from both Christianity and traditional Kikuyu religious beliefs in order to create 
a political and military organization that became a pseudo-religion (Majdalany, 1963, pp. 
72-74). 
At the time, the Kikuyu were a spiritually vulnerable society that was seeking to 
reconcile Christianity with the ancient religion of the culture.  The Mau Mau presented a 
solution which was “a subtle invocation of primeval forces, long forgotten, but still 
unknowingly felt in the deep subconscious” (Majdalany, 1963, p. 72).  By merging the 
traditional beliefs of the culture with Christian themes, the Mau Mau “religion” provided 
the direction the Kikuyu needed in a world of uncertainty.   
In order to reinforce the authority of the Mau Mau religion, its leaders borrowed 
from Christian hymns and the Apostles Creed. McConnell observes that the Mau Mau 
creed was constructed to make allusions to both the traditional and Christian belief 
structures.  This creed was repeated daily by its followers, and its primary public figure, 
Jomo Kenyatta, was introduced as a proxy for Jesus Christ (McConnell, 2005, p. 21).  By 
elevating Kenyatta to the divine, the Mau Mau provided the Kikuyu a needed symbol of 
authority and guidance.  The insurgency also used church leaders to proclaim the 
righteousness of this new religion, adding to the validity of the Mau Mau as a source of 
authority. 
According to Majdalany, the Mau Mau would begin meetings under the 
respectable cover of the KAU.  These meetings incorporated the subversive Mau Mau 
hymns in order to spread their propaganda.  After this part of the meeting, the real Mau 
Mau meeting would begin where recruitment, oath taking, and calls to violence would 
occur.  This strategy had two profound effects.  First, subversive propaganda was 
projected by the authority of the KAU and the religion of the Mau Mau.  Second, the 
religious atmosphere invoked the authority of God that created the impression that the  
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crowd was called to fight for a holy cause (Majdalany, 1963, pp. 73-74).  The Mau Mau 
leaders’ profound understanding of the Kikuyu need for spirituality allowed them to gain 
influence where none existed before. 
4. The Role of Social Proof 
Cialdini’s principle of social proof was used extensively by the Mau Mau, due to 
the suspicious and reclusive nature of the Kikuyu people.  According to Majdalany, the 
Kikuyu possess an arrogance that borders on a sense of superiority.  While detrimental to 
those attempting to gain the trust of the people, this arrogance also fosters a powerful 
sense of community among the people.  An adverse effect of the Kikuyu sense of 
superiority is a “type of mass neurosis which, masquerading as patriotism or nationalism, 
can temporarily drive a people mad” (Majdalany, 1963, p. 30).  This aspect of the Kikuyu 
renders the people extremely susceptible to the use of the social proof principle. 
Cialdini proposed two conditions by which the principle of social proof was 
particularly powerful: uncertainty and similarity.  The situation in Kenya exhibited both 
of these characteristics, which provided an environment open to exploitation.  
Uncertainty among the Kikuyu, however, was mostly a product of the actions of Mau 
Mau themselves.  The Kikuyu had adapted well to the policies of the British, and the tribe 
was generally content—with the exception of the extreme nationalists (Majdalany, 1963).  
The fanaticism of the Mau Mau religion, coupled with the increasingly severe reaction of 
the British to Mau Mau violence, was instrumental in creating the uncertainty necessary 
to unite the Kikuyu people. 
The Mau Mau’s method of recruiting took the principle of similarity beyond the 
Kikuyu community as a whole.  The units were often based on the structure of dispersed 
village groups.  These villages had an innate sense of community, and traditionally 
responded to any neighbor in need.  The Mau Mau used this dynamic to expand their 
membership to the friends, neighbors, and relatives of those already committed to the 
insurgency (Barnett & Njama, 1966).  By initially recruiting a small number of people in 
a community, the principle of social proof took over and others followed. 
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5. Other Uses of the Principles of Influence 
Although commitment and consistency, authority, and social proof were the 
primary principles of influence used by the Mau Mau insurgency to gain influence, two 
additional principles were used to a lesser extent.  Liking was specifically employed by 
the Mau Mau and its political front, the KAU.  Physical attractiveness and association 
were the primary aspects of liking used by both entities.  Majdalany describes Jomo 
Kenyatta as a tall, athletically built, and handsome man—attributes that made him a 
popular figure (Majdalany, 1963, p. 48).  Kenyatta’s physical attributes, along with his 
eloquence and charm, contributed to his rise as the leader of the KAU and his influence 
with the Kikuyu population. 
The Mau Mau also utilized association primarily through the role of women in 
their organization.  Majdalany states that women played an important role in the growth 
of the organization.  The Mau Mau included a quota of women in their fighting gangs in 
order to attract young men to the group.  By associating their organization with women, 
they were able to bring young fighting men into the insurgency (Majdalany, 1963, p. 60).   
The principle of liking also influenced the British settlers in Kenya.  The 
Europeans living in the country generally liked the Kikuyu who worked for them on their 
estates.  They could not believe that their servants would join a violent organization like 
Mau Mau.  The settlers’ liking of their servants backfired when those same servants 
would act against them in Mau Mau raids of the settlers’ estates.  The Europeans’ 
affection for their servants influenced their actions in protecting themselves from the 
insurgents’ attacks (Majdalany, 1963, p. 120). 
Scarcity was not actively used by the Mau Mau during their uprising against the 
British.  The principle, however, still played a role in influencing the Kikuyu population.  
Cialdini described the phenomenon of “newly experienced” scarcity, by which an 
uprising or revolution is more likely during a period of hardship that follows a period of 
relative abundance.  The population, having experienced economic success or increased 
civil rights, revolts when these are taken away.  This was the case in the Mau Mau 
Uprising as well.  Although British land policies concerning the Kikuyu were unfair long 
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before the uprising, scarcity of land designated for the Kikuyu worsened following World 
War II.  This caused increased resentment toward the European settlers, and incited many 
to join the Mau Mau insurgency. 
6. Use of the Principles of Influence in Counterinsurgency Efforts 
 The British also used Cialdini’s principles in their counterinsurgency campaign 
against the Mau Mau.  As previously stated, the British used pseudo-gangs in order to 
infiltrate the Mau Mau camps and eradicate the cells.  This took advantage of the 
commitments made by the Mau Mau insurgents, and they used those commitments 
against them.  Because the Mau Mau relied on commitment in order to recruit its 
members, the British were able to use agents to make those same commitments and 
infiltrate the Mau Mau. 
 The British also implemented social programs in their efforts to get commitments 
from the Kikuyu people.  They initiated a program of the Scouts for the boys and young 
men of the Kenya.  The purpose of the Scouts was to instill a sense of community and 
loyalty to the colonial government, and was effective in getting the young men to make a 
commitment to a group outside of the Mau Mau (McConnell, 2005, p. 33).   
 The British also used reciprocation in their attempts to “reeducate” the detained 
Mau Mau insurgents.  Reeducation was based around the British being able to convince 
individuals that the path to success was through the colonials, not through the Mau Mau.  
The British offered the insurgents a better life than that of a Mau Mau terrorist, and this 
proved to be effective in siphoning supporters away from the Mau Mau (McConnell, 
2005, p. 31). 
 Reciprocation was also used to address one of the issues that first led to the rise of 
the Mau Mau: land.  As the British seized lands occupied by the Mau Mau, they would 
turn control of that land over to Kikuyu people that were loyal to the government.  Land 
reform practices gave the Kikuyu their own land to cultivate and earn a profit.  This was 
also effective in gaining some support for the British government in Kenya (McConnell, 
2005, pp. 34-35). 
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D. THE 26TH OF JULY MOVEMENT (THE CUBAN REVOLUTION) 
1. Background 
The 26th of July Movement (M-26-7) was the insurgent revolutionary 
organization, led by Fidel Castro that, in 1959, overthrew the Batista government in 
Cuba.  M-26-7, its name taken from a failed attack by Castro on the Moncada Barracks in 
1953, re-formed in 1955 by a group of exiled revolutionaries, including Castro, his 
brother, Raul, and Argentinean Ernesto Che Guevara.  Its goal was to train an organized 
guerrilla force dedicated to the installation of a new government in Cuba.  The 
insurgency operated in Cuba from 1953 to 1958, and ended in 1959 with Castro’s 
takeover (DeFronzo, 1991). 
Cuba was a Spanish colony from its discovery by Christopher Columbus to the 
late 19th century.  In 1898, after years of struggle for independence from Spain, the 
United States assumed control of the island following its victory in the Spanish-American 
War.  The Americans relinquished control of Cuba to the independent government in 
1902, with the stipulation that the U.S. would have the right to intervene for the 
preservation of an independent Cuba.  During the first half of the 20th century, Cuba 
experienced several tumultuous coups and takeovers.  Fidel Castro, already a noted orator 
and political activist, was running for congress in the 1952 elections under the Ortodoxo 
party.  He had already built a strong base of support, and his victory was all but assured.  
This changed when, three months before the election, former president, Fulgencio 
Batista, staged a coup and took control of the government.  It was at then that Castro and 
his brother decided to turn to armed insurrection to force a change in Cuba (DeFronzo, 
1991). 
Castro’s group decided that armed insurrection was necessary to oust Batista.  
The rebels planned to take the Moncada Barracks in Santiago in order to establish a base 
for a general uprising.  The raid was a failure, and the Castros and several others were 
arrested and incarcerated.  Batista, seeking to improve his public image, released the 
popular rebels after a short prison term.  Looking to avoid any obstacles in reorganizing 
the revolution, Castro fled to Mexico in 1955. 
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While in Mexico, Castro consolidated his power base and organized training for 
the rebel faction.  During this time, he travelled to the United States and raised thousands 
of dollars for arms and supplies from Cuban exiles.  While in Mexico, the Castro brothers 
met Ernesto Che Guevara, who also joined M-26-7.  Having sufficiently armed and 
trained his followers, Castro set his sights on a return to Cuba. 
In December 1956, Castro and a group of rebels landed in Cuba, but were soon 
ambushed by Batista’s forces acting on a tip from a local guide.  The Castros and 
Guevara escaped and reassembled in the mountains, where they quickly gained support 
and recruits from the local rural population.  Here they staged ambushes and raids on 
vulnerable military outposts in order to stockpile weapons for the coming conflict.  In 
order to undermine the rebel cause, Batista declared that Castro had been killed.  Castro 
responded by inviting a reporter from The New York Times for an interview.  His 
charisma and claims of seeking peaceful relations with the United States resulted in 
widespread support for M-26-7 in the United States and elsewhere (DeFronzo, 1991). 
M-26-7 gained more support by organizing a National Directorate that included 
representatives from moderate groups and the rebel guerrillas, united to oust the Batista 
regime.  Throughout 1957 and 1958, urban assaults by moderate factions outside of 
Castro’s control were met with defeat at the hands of the regime.  This benefited M-26-7 
in that the elimination of moderate leaders increased the influence of Castro as a leader of 
the revolution.  The failed assaults also resulted in popular outrage at the brutal treatment 
of revolutionaries at the hands of Batista’s forces.  Soon after, the United States severed 
all support of Batista’s military, taking away a major supply of arms for the conflict. 
At this point, morale in the Cuban military was quickly declining, due to defeats 
at the hands of the mountain rebels and the shortage of arms and munitions.  Corruption 
raged in the officer ranks, and any remaining popular support for the military quickly 
declined.  As a result, M-26-7 accomplished a decisive victory over Batista’s forces in the 
summer of 1958.  Soon after, a large number of guerrillas, led by Guevara, descended 




resistance from the demoralized Cuban army.  By January 1959, Batista had fled the 
country, and Castro had seized power in Cuba.  The event was enthusiastically received 
by the people of Cuba (DeFronzo, 1991). 
2. The Role of Authority 
The authority of M-26-7’s leadership, particularly Fidel Castro, was a major 
factor in the insurgency’s influence on the people of Cuba.  The organization centered its 
actions and ideas on those of Castro.  Castro was an educated man, heavily involved in 
the politics of the country, and had already gained a large following prior to Batista’s 
coup.  Castro’s foray into Cuban politics established his authority as a political figure 
well before M-26-7’s insurgency began. 
Although Castro was the primary authority figure in the organization, he enlisted 
the help of recognized leaders in Cuba in order to increase the perception of the 
insurgency’s legitimacy.  These men included Raúl Chibás, brother of the founder of the 
Ortodoxo Party and Felipe Pazos, former president of the National Bank.  Together they 
issued a joint statement advocating a provisional government, civil liberties, and social 
reform (Pérez-Stable, 1993).  These men lent the insurgency legitimacy via their 
positions as authority figures in the country. 
Castro also invoked the authority of the 1940 Cuban Constitution in order to 
project legitimacy and gain influence.  Castro’s assertion that the aims of his organization 
were to restore the Constitution of 1940 utilized the authority inherent in a legal national 
document such as a constitution.  This public assertion by Castro provided the appearance 
of authority necessary to use the principle for influence of the population.  In reality, the 
insurgency’s activities focused mainly on the ousting of Batista, rather than the specifics 
of a post-Batista Cuba (Pérez-Stable, 1993, p. 59). 
3. The Role of Commitment and Consistency 
Commitment to the cause of M-26-7 by the central leadership of the insurgency 
mostly came in the form of publicized written statements asserting their goals.  While 
these statements served to increase the visibility of the group within the country, they 
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also committed the leadership to the direction of armed insurrection (Pérez-Stable, 1993).  
By assuming responsibility of their actions and asserting dedication to the goal of ousting 
Batista, the leaders of group demonstrated Cialdini’s assertion that public and written 
statements strengthen the power of commitment. 
The most powerful of these written public statements was the Sierra Manifesto, a 
document that was a source of much contention with M-26-7.  This Manifesto not only 
outlined the demands and goals of the insurgency, but also partially outlined the future of 
Cuba after Batista was brought down (Guevara, 1996, p. 194-196).  Although the 
document was not fully supported by Castro or Guevara, it was published in Cuban 
newspapers, and demonstrated the commitment of the organization to the people of Cuba.  
Even if the Manifesto was not fully supported by the leadership, it still acted as an 
official public statement committing them to a particular path. 
4. The Role of Liking 
Liking was another principle critical to the influence of Castro and M-26-7.  
Liking was evident in gaining influence both internally and internationally.  Both the 
organization as a whole and Castro as its leader benefited from the principle.  M-26-7 
stood for principles which were attractive to both Cubans and those outside of the 
country, and Castro’s persona made him a likable individual. 
Castro was considered an extremely gifted orator with a very likable public 
personality.  Privately, he was a fierce supporter of those who sympathized with his 
cause, which made him quite popular within the organization itself.  Aside from the 
authority he exhibited as leader of the insurgency, its members genuinely liked him as a 
man.  Internationally, Castro desired the support of displaced Cubans living in the United 
States.  His interview with The New York Times in 1957 had a particularly positive effect 
on his image abroad.  He presented himself as a moderate patriot without ties to Marxism 
fighting a corrupt dictatorship.  The interview not only provided hope to the Cuban 




the United States population as a whole (DeFronzo, 1991).  This perception increased his 
likability in a country with which Cuba had a tenuous relationship.  Many aspects of his 
perceived ideals, however, would prove to be false. 
According to Guevara, Castro was very loyal to his friends within the insurgent 
organization.  During their incarceration following the failed raid on Moncada, the group 
never lost confidence in their leader.  He was committed to the people he led, and would 
not leave a man behind, even if it was detrimental to the revolutionary cause.  Guevara 
states that Castro’s personal attitude toward the people in his organization was the key to 
the fanatical loyalty he inspired (Guevara, 1996, p. 85).  Castro’s personal loyalty to his 
people made him an extremely likable leader. 
The M-26-7 itself also employed liking in order to gain influence.  Because of its 
association with goals such as agrarian reform and personal civil liberties, the insurgency 
was well liked by the working class and farmers of Cuba.  These ideals also appealed to 
people living outside of the country, within and outside of the displaced Cuban 
population.   
5. Other Uses of the Principles of Influence 
Castro and M-26-7 also used reciprocation and social proof in the insurgency’s 
attempts to gain influence, both internally and externally.  The ideals which the 
organization supported were not only important to the liking of the insurgents, but were 
also a promise to the working-class and famers of Cuba.  Their promises of agrarian 
reform, restoration of civil liberties, and a greater distribution of sugar profits served as 
an offering to the majority of the Cuban people (Pérez-Stable, 1993).  By offering these 
things to the people, the insurgency gained support through reciprocation.   
The organization offered more than just the promise of change as an offering for 
the support of the Cubans.  The insurgency also provided much-needed relief for the 
peasants living in the areas of the Sierras controlled by the rebel guerrillas.  The people 
were provided with medicines, food, and trade by the rebel army.  According to Guevara, 
the rebels set up lucrative trade agreements with the peasants in the area—an agreement 
that benefitted both parties (Guevara, 1996).  Not only did the rebels acquire needed 
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supplies in exchange, but they also received total support from the local population.  The 
principle of reciprocation required that the population support the rebels in return for the 
benefits they received. 
The rebels also used the uncertainty of the Cuban people to gain influence 
through social proof.  Guevara’s “Foco Theory,” which he published in his book 
Guerrilla Warfare in 1960, was a key basis of Castro’s revolution.  The Foco Theory’s 
idea of near-simultaneous uprisings reflects a kind of “social proof” effect.  Every rural 
area through which the rebel army marched had been repressed by the Cuban 
government.  Their lands had been taken away, and they were forced to relocate by 
wealthy landowners or the government itself.  Everyday life of these people was filled 
with constant uncertainty, which M-26-7 used to provide direction to these peasants.  The 
rebels also took advantage of similarity to strengthen the social proof principle.  The 
army was a group of seemly hardworking Cuban men wearing straw hats (Guevara, 
1996).  It was a group of people with which the peasantry could identify, and that could 
provide the direction desired by the people in these rural areas.  
6. Use of the Principles of Influence in Counterinsurgency Efforts 
Batista utilized some of Cialdini’s principles, but not to any great extent.  Batista 
generally leaned on the power of his army to maintain control, but he also utilized both 
authority and reciprocation after the election of 1954.  Batista used the authority of a 
democratic election to bolster his claim that his rule was legitimate.  Although he was 
unopposed, the “overwhelming support” of the Cuban people was his claim as the 
authority figure of the Cuban government.  While this was temporarily effective in 
stabilizing the Cuban government, the authority of his election was never fully accepted 
(Pérez-Stable, 1993, p. 53). 
Batista also used reciprocation in the form of “concessions.”  Cialdini stated that 
concessions are often used to gain an unfair advantage for those seeking compliance.  By 
conceding certain points he tried to get the people to accept his claim as dictator of Cuba.  
These included the right of political parties to convene and amnesty for political 
prisoners.  These supposed gifts from Batista to the people were unable to mask the 
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corrupt nature of the Cuban government.  Batista attempted to gain influence by 
reciprocating, but was never able to quell his dissenters (Pérez-Stable, 1993, p. 54).   
E. EOKA AND CYPRUS 
1. Background 
Ethnike Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA) was an extreme right-wing 
insurgent organization that fought against British rule in Cyprus from 1955-1959.  Led by 
General George Grivas, EOKA’s purpose was: “By deeds of heroism and self-sacrifice to 
draw the attention of international public opinion…to the Cyprus question” (Grivas, 
1962, p. 5).  The “Cyprus question” was the idea of freeing Cyprus from British colonial 
rule.  While it was never official stated by Grivas, it is generally accepted that EOKA’s 
aims included enosis (i.e., unification of Greece and Cyprus). 
Cyprus has a long history of occupation, from the Phoenicians to the British.  
While it is not large, its location in the Mediterranean Sea is of strategic importance.  In 
the late 1800s, Cyprus was a little-used outpost in the Ottoman Empire, and the British 
came to an occupation agreement with the Turks in 1878.  Although England was still an 
occupier, the majority Greek Cypriots saw hope in the new rule after years of oppression 
by the Turkish government.  The British improved infrastructure, maintained peace, and 
allowed religious freedom in the country.  The British government’s promises of 
reunification with Greece, however, remained unfulfilled. 
In 1925, the British officially declared Cyprus a crown colony, and relations 
between the government and Greek Cypriots continued to deteriorate.  Several years of 
unrest followed, highlighted by demonstrations and a minor uprising in 1931.  Almost 
two decades of authoritarian rule followed, and in 1948, the British government offered 
Cypriots increased representation in the legislature.  The Cypriots rejected the offer, 
declaring that Enosis was the only acceptable offer.  In response, the British banned the 
idea of Enosis in speech and print.  This only further incited the Enosis movement (Foley 
& Scobie, 1975).  
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In 1950, Makarios III was named Archbishop of Cyprus, and became the civil 
leader of the Greek Cypriots by tradition.  Makarios greatly supported the Enosis 
movement, and was inciting support for the movement among the Greek Cypriots.  He 
continued to press his case to the largely indifferent international community, while the 
frequency of Enosis demonstrations increased.  Having determined that stronger action 
was needed, Makarios recruited Grivas to lead the cause in Cyprus and in 1951, Grivas 
arrived in Cyprus in secrecy (Foley & Scobie, 1975). 
Grivas believed that the support of the Greek Cypriot population was essential to 
the success of a guerrilla campaign on the island, due to its small size and harsh terrain.  
To gain that support, he decided that recruiting the youth of Cyprus would serve as a 
catalyst to incite the generally passive Greek Cypriot population.  While Grivas 
continued to garner support for the insurgency, Makarios worked to achieve a diplomatic 
solution to the Cyprus question (Grivas, 1962).  The British, however, withdrawing their 
forces from the Suez Canal, and decided on Cyprus as its bastion of influence in the 
Middle East.  Thus, the number of British troops on the island was gradually increasing. 
In 1954, preparations for the campaign against the British began in earnest.  
Grivas began training the group in the use of small arms and explosives, and maintained 
strict secrecy on his location and actions.  In January 1955, a major arms shipment from 
Greece was confiscated by the British, and Grivas was forced to begin operations with a 
much smaller number of arms than originally planned.  He was able to salvage explosive 
materials from old British mines and shells, and the group began manufacturing 
explosives from local materials.  On April 1, 1955, Grivas gave the order for the first 
attacks to commence in the town of Nicosia, and proclaimed the name of the insurgency 
to be EOKA (Foley & Scobie, 1975). 
The EOKA campaign was unique in that its targets were generally military 
installations and patrols, police forces, and British soldiers and informers.  The 
insurgency did not make any attempts for territorial control, due to the ratio of British to 
EOKA forces and the unique terrain of the island.  The campaign of bombings and small 
skirmishes continued for several years.  The British were never dealt a crippling blow by 
EOKA, but the insurgency continued to gain support from the local population.  The fear 
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of attack, however, slowly drained at the British forces in Cyprus, and the resulting lack 
of restraint prompted the use of unconventional methods in countering EOKA.  The 
British began to assume that every Greek was a potential guerrilla, and harsh restrictions 
were placed on the population (Foley & Scobie, 1975). 
In late 1958, Grivas bowed to pressure from Athens and declared a suspension of 
EOKA operations in support of peace talks to settle the Cyprus question.  In February 
1959, a decision was reached to declare the island an independent nation with a set ratio 
of minority Turkish and majority Greek representation in government, and British control 
of certain bases.  Makarios agreed to this accord without Grivas’ input, and Grivas felt 
that it went against the ideals of the EOKA movement.  Makarios, however, agreed to the 
terms under the threat of partitioning the island.  Soon after, Grivas and Makarios 
mended the disagreement and EOKA was disbanded.  While Enosis was never achieved, 
EOKA had succeeded in forcing the issue and essentially ending British rule of Cyprus 
(Foley & Scobie, 1975). 
2. The Role of Commitment and Consistency 
General Grivas employed several methods in order to strengthen the commitment 
of his young guerrilla troops in the fight against the British in Cyprus.  Like the Mau 
Mau, EOKA employed a form of oath taking that committed young men to the cause.  
These oaths, however, were much milder in form and action than the extreme Mau Mau 
oaths.  Additionally, EOKA oaths did not evoke the mysticism and superstition that the 
Mau Mau oaths possessed.  On the other hand, the oaths administered by EOKA did 
provide the strength of the verbal commitment that Cialdini describes. 
According to Foley and Scobie in The Struggle for Cyprus, Grivas and other 
EOKA leaders administered oaths to the young fighters.  They were made to place their 
hands on the Bible and swear to work for the liberation of Cyprus, to obey their leaders’ 
orders, and to never reveal the secrets of the organization (1975).  The use of the Bible 
added to the seriousness of the oath by including the religion of the Greek Cypriots in the 
ceremony.  The importance of the Greek Orthodox religion was central to the EOKA 
struggle and will be discussed at length later in this chapter. 
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Grivas also employed the same basic technique used by the Chinese as described 
by Cialdini.  The actions initially taken by the Greek Cypriot fighters involved non-
violent political actions in order to solidify their commitment to the organization.  In 
Guerrilla Warfare, Grivas describes his method of increasingly violent commitments to 
EOKA.  First, he would task the young Greek Cypriots to distribute proclamations, rouse 
demonstrations, and collect information on those suspected of supporting the British.  
Subsequently, he assigned these same youths to organize saboteurs, manufacture 
explosives, and supervise passive resistance measures.  From this group of young men, 
Grivas would select the guerrilla fighters he used in the fight against the British (Grivas, 
1964).   
3. The Role of Authority 
The authority of the EOKA insurgency mostly derived from its backing and 
leadership of Archbishop Makarios, and through him, the Orthodox Church.  Makarios’ 
use of authority extended beyond the island of Cyprus and into his dealings with the 
Greek government in Athens as well.  The Orthodox Church provided the Greek Cypriots 
with a sense of community on an island shared with Turks and ruled by the British.  The 
Greek Cypriot loyalty to the Orthodox Church provided the authority and direction 
needed to incite the population to resistance.  In his study of social change and the case of 
Cyprus, Kyriacos Markides suggests that without the involvement of the Church, the 
evolution of the movement may have been very different (Markides, 1974).  This 
indicates that the power of the Church’s authority in Cyprus was very important to the 
movement. 
The office of the Archbishop of Cyprus was considered to be the only legitimate 
political representative of the Greek Cypriots.  The support of EOKA by the Archbishop 
of Cyprus translated into support of the insurgency by the entire Greek Cypriot people.  
Makarios never forgot that it was his title as the archbishop that provided most of his 
political capital, both in Cyprus and abroad.  In order to reinforce this image, he made 
extensive use of authoritative symbols.  The symbols of his office conveyed his authority 
to both direct and speak for the Cypriot Hellenes. 
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Cialdini describes the manner in which symbols are able to convey authority.  The 
use of symbols, such as clothes and titles, were instrumental in reinforcing the authority 
of the Archbishop of Cyprus.  Kyriacos Markides, in his book The Rise and Fall of the 
Cyprus Republic, Makarios utilized such symbols as carrying the Byzantine scepter, 
wearing purple in ceremonies, and signing his name in red ink.  Markides states, “These 
symbolic rights and pageantry of imperial majesty added special color and glamour to the 
archbishop’s stature and strengthened the roots of his authority” (Markides, 1977, p. 38). 
Makarios’ position as the archbishop also strengthened his influence in dealing 
with political entities outside of Cyprus.  This was especially true when parlaying with 
the Greek government in Athens.  Due to his position as archbishop, and the importance 
of the Orthodox Church in Greece, the tradition of kissing the hands of the archbishop 
extended even to the political leaders of Greece (Markides, 1977).  This initial deference 
to Makarios’ office provided at least a modicum of authority in discussions with Athens. 
Authority was also a factor in Grivas’ influence in Cyprus.  His position did not 
carry the weight of religion behind it, but his followers were fiercely loyal to him.  He 
was an accomplished military leader, and that reputation reinforced his authority as the 
operational leader of EOKA.  Grivas had great confidence in the Greek Cypriots’ loyalty 
to him, and relied on that loyalty to support his military efforts.  While his complete 
commitment to the cause of Enosis contributed to this loyalty, his reputation as an 
effective military leader.  He also utilized a title that conveyed authority by adopting the 
pseudonym “Diginis” (Grivas, 1964).  By taking the name of a legendary folk hero, it 
added to the mythos of Grivas, bolstering the authority of his proclamations and 
propaganda. 
4. The Role of Social Proof 
 As stated in Chapter II, Cialdini stresses the role of similarity and uncertainty in 
enhancing the effectiveness of social proof.  He demonstrates that one who can provide 
direction in an uncertain situation can often elicit compliance from a group of people.  
The uncertainty of the conflict with the British and the similarity present in the Greek 
Cypriot community played important roles in EOKA’s use of social proof to gain 
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influence in Cyprus.  While Grivas himself provided much of the direction for the Greek 
Cypriot community, he also employed the same principle in more localized groups. 
 Grivas realized that the success or failure of EOKA’s insurgency was dependent 
on the support of the Greeks on the island.  In order to incite action from the population 
as a whole, he began by choosing key men from towns where enthusiasm for the patriotic 
struggle was more apparent.  These key men were to inspire action in the people of these 
towns, and that enthusiasm would then spread among the community.  According to 
Grivas, he was correct in his assumptions (Grivas, 1964).   
 The practice of recruiting key men took advantage of both similarity and 
uncertainty.  The people needed direction in the conflict, and anyone who could provide 
direction would likely be followed.  Additionally, the key men were not only similar in 
Greek heritage, but also lived in the towns where they were tasked to take action.  
Cialdini demonstrated that the more a target of compliance is similar to the one seeking 
compliance, the stronger the principle of social proof is in a given situation; and Grivas 
effectively employed this aspect of social proof. 
5. Other Uses of the Principles of Influence 
Although commitment and consistency, authority, and social proof were most 
evident in EOKA’s use of the principles of influence, the insurgency also utilized liking 
and scarcity.  As previously demonstrated, Grivas employed the aspect of similarity in 
order to enhance the effect of social proof.  Additionally, he used similarity in a different 
fashion to improve his image and utilize the principle of liking.  According to Foley and 
Scobie, he changed his manner of dressing in order to suit his surroundings.  In an urban 
setting, Grivas would dress the part of a “sober-suited citizen” with dark glasses and hat.  
In the mountains, however, he “became the typical Cypriot peasant,” wearing peasant 
clothing, getting a tan, and growing a patriarchal moustache (Foley & Scobie, 1975, p. 
55).  Although the change in persona most likely had security implications as well, 
Grivas’ similarity to the local population allowed him to exert his influence more 
effectively. 
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EOKA also used association to get the population to like the organization, thereby 
supporting its cause.  In keeping with the nationalist nature of the movement, the 
insurgency associated itself with ideals of patriotism, honor, and the love of Mother 
Greece (Markides, 1977).  Grivas’ own strategic plan for the campaign made liberal use 
of intangible ideals such as heroism, sacrifice, and determination (Grivas, 1963).  
Furthermore, support from the Orthodox Church produced another positive association 
for EOKA. 
As with the Mau Mau Uprising, the principle of scarcity was manifested in 
Cialdini’s idea of newly experienced scarcity.  Just as in Kenya, the British responded to 
the initial wave of violence in Cyprus with policies that repressed the population’s 
liberties.  Policies such as detention without cause, seizure of property, and searches 
without warrant took away the rights that Cypriots were accustomed to having (Foley & 
Scobie, 1975).  By making scarce the liberties to which the Cypriots had become 
accustomed, the British inadvertently bolstered EOKA’s cause. 
One episode of the conflict that illustrates this phenomenon is described in 
Guerrilla Warfare.  Grivas demonstrates the effect of scarcity in describing the British 
banning of the flying of the Greek flag over school buildings.  The Greek Cypriots had 
practiced this for many years as a symbol of solidarity and community.  Following the 
commencement of hostilities, the Greek flag was declared “foreign” by the British 
government.  The result of this action was demonstrations, increased fanaticism among 
the youth, and more people joining the EOKA cause (Grivas, 1963).  Although EOKA 
did not actively utilize scarcity, the actions of the British were instrumental in introducing 
the principle to the conflict.   
6. Use of the Principles of Influence in Counterinsurgency Efforts 
The British response to the EOKA insurgency was generally devoid of efforts to 
use Cialdini’s principles of influence.  The British primarily relied on strength of force 
and repression of the people in order to maintain order and undermine the efforts of 
EOKA.  While EOKA never was fully defeated by British Forces, they could never really 
confront the British due to the lack of numbers in the guerrilla forces.  EOKA was able to 
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disrupt the British efforts, but never overwhelmingly so.  The end of the conflict came 
mostly from Makarios’ desire to for peace, which resulted in Cyprus’ independence.  
Although the British never gained much influence with the Greek Cypriot people, it may 
not have been necessary to do so, due to the generally passive support given to EOKA by 
the people. 
F. NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF SOUTH VIETNAM 
1. Background 
The National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF), also known as the Viet 
Cong, was a communist insurgency who waged a guerrilla war against the United States 
and South Vietnam during the Vietnam War (1959-1975).  The organization fought 
closely with the regular North Vietnamese Army and the government of North Vietnam.  
The NLF’s stated purpose was the reunification of Vietnam, which they hoped to 
accomplish with the overthrow of the Diem government in South Vietnam.  The actions 
of the NLF were instrumental in withdrawal of U.S. forces and the eventual unification of 
Vietnam as a Communist state. 
The NLF was formed in 1960 by South Vietnamese nationalists under the 
leadership of the southern branch of Vietnam’s Communist party.  The derogatory term 
Viet Cong (Viet Communists) was coined by the Diem government, whom the NLF 
hoped would quickly fall to a massive popular uprising.  The decision to form the NLF 
for armed resistance was met with overwhelming support from both revolutionaries and 
Communists in South Vietnam.  The ranks of the NLF rapidly expanded to 70,000 by 
1963, and attacks on South Vietnam’s army increased (DeFronzo, 1991). 
With the support of the United States, the Diem government initiated the strategic 
hamlet program, by which the peasant population was relocated to fortified locations.  
The goals of the program were to protect the population from NLF terrorism and to 
isolate the population from the influence of the NLF.  This policy, however, was 




Diem’s efforts to stifle the NLF were largely ineffective, and by 1963, his efforts were 
clearly losing the war.  Diem’s unpopularity with the South Vietnamese forces resulted in 
his execution at the hands of his generals (DeFronzo, 1991). 
With the end of the Diem regime, corruption became a major problem for the 
forces of South Vietnam, and the NLF continued to expand its influence in the south.  
The United States concluded that a stronger military presence was necessary, and began a 
massive bombing campaign over North Vietnam in 1965.  The escalation of the conflict 
brought North Vietnamese regulars over the border into South Vietnam to aid the NLF 
fighters.  By 1967, U.S. forces had reached 500,000, and a constrained South Vietnamese 
election occurred in that same year.  These events led to the Communist forces launching 
the Tet Offensive in 1968 (DeFronzo, 1991). 
The Tet Offensive was a major event in the NLF’s campaign against the United 
States and South Vietnam.  Communist leaders hoped that the offensive would force 
Saigon’s military into defensive positions; destroy confidence in the Saigon government 
to provide security; and disrupt any plans of an invasion in the north by the U.S. or South 
Vietnam.  Additionally, they hoped that the offensive would erode U.S. public support 
for the war.  The offensive was conducted almost exclusively by NLF forces, which 
simultaneously attacked 100 cities and towns, including Saigon itself.  Despite early 
success by the NLF, all major cities and towns that were taken by their forces were 
quickly recaptured by South Vietnamese and U.S. forces.  The NLF suffered heavy 
casualties, and the offensive was almost a complete military failure, but it was a success 
in the realm of information warfare. 
The Tet Offensive did have positive psychological effects for the NLF efforts. 
First, Saigon’s perceived authority over much of the countryside was weakened.  Second, 
and most importantly, it had a profound negative effect on U.S. public opinion of the war.  
Following the Tet offensive, the NLF was severely weakened, but those that remained 
continued to wage the insurgency.  By 1973, the United States had already begun 
transferring military control to South Vietnam, and a peace agreement was reached 
between the two sides (DeFronzo, 1991). 
 52
The 1973 peace agreement allowed for a North Vietnamese presence in the south 
and a coalition government of both South Vietnamese and NLF officials.  The Saigon 
government was outraged by the agreement, and continued to attack NLF forces in order 
to squeeze them out of the south. Saigon’s forces, however, were without U.S. support 
and quickly collapsed under the North Vietnamese response.  By 1975, Saigon had 
surrendered to the Communist-led forces and Vietnam became a unified country in 1976 
and by 1977, the NLF was disbanded (DeFronzo, 1991). 
2. The Role of Reciprocation 
The use of the principle of reciprocation by the NLF was most effective in its 
attempt to gain influence in the rural villages of South Vietnam.  The NLF’s primary goal 
in gaining influence within the country was to affect the attitudes of the peasants in the 
rural village.  They planned to use the peasants as their base for both recruiting and 
support in the jungles of South Vietnam.  Reciprocation was a large part of their strategy 
to elicit compliance within these populations. 
The primary concern for the rural South Vietnamese was land.  Both the French 
and South Vietnamese governments controlled the rights to the land, and the peasants 
were forced to pay large rents to the government in order to use the land.  This problem 
was exacerbated by the strategic hamlet program of South Vietnam and the United States.  
The NLF offered exactly what the rural Vietnamese needed: land.  It was around this that 
the NLF based their indoctrination program.  By receiving lands from the NLF, the 
peasant farmers took on an obligation to support the NLF cadre.  According to Douglas 
Pike in his book, Viet Cong, the land that farmers received from the NLF became an 
indoctrination device unto itself.  The peasants were invested in the NLF’s success 
because of the benefits provided by the insurgency (Pike, 1966). 
Besides the promises of land, other rewards were offered to those who joined the 
NLF’s cause.  Paul Berman’s excellent study of the motivations of those who joined the 
NLF, Revolutionary Organization, outlines the many rewards presented to those peasants 
who joined.  The NLF offered prestige through social advancement and heroism.  
Additionally, education in writing and mathematics was given to those living in the 
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“liberated areas.”  These schools not only served as a benefit to the people, but also as a 
platform for NLF indoctrination and training.  The peasants perceived the NLF as a group 
who would bring them prosperity, and in turn, became obligated to support the 
insurgency (Berman, 1974). 
3. The Role of Commitment and Consistency 
The principle of commitment and consistency was perhaps the most heavily 
utilized of Cialdini’s principles by the National Liberation Front.  Pike describes the 
process of inducing a commitment to the NLF through the solicitation of monetary funds.  
The funds requested by the NLF were small at first.  The cadre would encourage a rural 
family to donate a token amount of money to the insurgency, but this was never taken by 
force.  This small contribution was an effective “foot-in-the-door” technique, and it 
planted the seeds of commitment in these rural families.  Subsequent solicitations for 
funds were for larger sums, and were often essentially forced on the population (Pike, 
1966).  This took advantage of two aspects of commitment described by Cialdini.  The 
first is that by not forcing the initial commitment, the NLF fostered internalization by the 
population.  As they did not feel pressured to make the commitment, it became a personal 
choice.  The second aspect is that of gradually increasing demands for commitment.  The 
small initial donation by the peasantry opened the door for the NLF to require large acts 
of commitment to the cause in the future.  Consistency dictated that the peasants were 
obligated to adhere to their initial commitment. 
Berman goes into great detail concerning the role of the principle of commitment 
and consistency among the rural population of South Vietnam.  He includes many first-
hand accounts of the tactics used by the NLF in order to exert influence over the 
population.  Berman states, “The [People’s Liberation Armed Forces] had an explicit 
doctrine of organizational compliance: it sought, indeed demanded, ‘voluntary 
conformity’ based upon ‘ideological commitment’ ” (Berman, 1974).  He presents the 
idea that individuals complied with the organization because they had internalized its 
values and had merged their self-identity to that of the PLF (Berman, 1974). 
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While commitment was the ideal of the insurgency, Berman argues that it was not 
fully realized by all of those who joined the NLF.  The method of recruitment was 
influential in gaining the commitment of the peasants.  Berman demonstrates that those 
who volunteered, even when initially captured in the fighting, were more likely to 
internalize the ideals the organization.  On the other hand, those who were forced to 
commit to joining the NLF were more likely to defect at some point (Berman, 1974).  
This validates Cialdini’s assertion that a personal, voluntary commitment is more 
effective in maintaining consistency than one that is forced by outside pressures. 
Commitment and consistency were also utilized in gaining compliance from 
external sources of support.  The early commitments of both North Vietnam and the 
Chinese facilitated continued support for the NLF.  In 1962, the secretary-general of the 
NLF embarked on an international tour of goodwill with fellow Communist 
sympathizers.  While he was general received well, the Chinese were particularly 
enthusiastic about the insurrection of the NLF.  During this visit, the NLF and the 
Chinese issued a joint statement condemning the role of the United States and cementing 
the support of the Chinese in the NLF’s struggle.  This early commitment provided a vital 
ally to the NLF’s efforts (Pike, 1966). 
Commitment was also essential to the insurgency’s relationship with the North 
Vietnamese (DRV).  As the NLF was formed by direction of North Vietnam, there was a 
sense of obligation to the revolutionaries in the South.  According to Pike, the DRV was 
irrevocably and totally committed to the support of the South Vietnamese insurgents.  
The complete support given to the NLF was instrumental in staking the reputation of the 
DRV on the success or failure of the NLF (Pike, 1966).  The DRV’s commitment also 
came in the form of arms and the lives of its men.  Failure to remain consistent to the 
NLF would have had a devastating effect on both the leadership and the insurgents’ 
morale (Duiker, 1996).  An inability to achieve reunification with the South would have 
completely discredited the leaders of the DRV. 
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4. The Role of Social Proof 
The NLF took advantage of the family and social dynamics of the rural 
Vietnamese people in order to utilize the principle of social proof.  Vietnamese culture 
dictated loyalty to both family and community, an external pressure not easily overcome.  
Additionally, the uncertainty of the conflict made the family structure vital to the 
Vietnamese culture.  This left the rural peoples of South Vietnam very susceptible to 
manipulation by the NLF. 
In Berman’s study, he describes the NLF’s strategy in utilizing social proof.  The 
insurgency would attempt to recruit a small number of peasants in a particular village.  
Once this initial recruiting base was established, the rest of the community often followed 
due to the intense social pressure of the villagers. The importance of collectivity in 
Vietnamese life made it extraordinarily difficult to resist “going along with the crowd.”  
To defy the wishes of family and community was to risk losing face in the eyes of one’s 
peers (Berman, 1974).  Pike reinforces this phenomenon by describing a common method 
of gaining initial compliance from members of the village.  Many of the insurgents, 
having been recruited elsewhere, would return to their village to gain the support of their 
family.  Family loyalty dictated that the other members of the family would not report 
their kin to South Vietnamese authorities.  The actions of one member reflected upon the 
reputation of the entire family, and they would then be labeled as traitors.  This 
encouraged at least tacit support from these family members (Pike, 1966). 
5. The Role of Liking 
In the early days of the NLF, liking was heavily utilized by the insurgency to 
influence the perceptions of the rural peasants.  The NLF represented idealism, 
community, and Vietnamese tradition, which appealed to the best impulses of the 
peasants.  The NLF recruiting effort was most effective when the individual being 
indoctrinated liked the members of the NLF.   Berman relates one man’s experience with 
the Viet Cong who describes fair and kind treatment by the cadre.  This man was 
captured South Vietnamese militia member, but their civil treatment eventually caused 
him to join the other side (Berman, 1974). 
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The NLF cadres worked very hard at maintaining the image of virtuousness to the 
peasants of South Vietnam.  They were instructed to treat villagers as “one of the family” 
and to include them in their circle of trust.  This was especially true of those captured in 
skirmishes with the South Vietnamese forces.  They would reeducate these prisoners, and 
the civil manner of treatment they exhibited made those prisoners more susceptible to 
NLF indoctrination (Berman, 1974). 
Not only was liking utilized to recruit, this same adherence to the liking principle 
was carried over into the ranks of the NLF.  The NLF leadership preached harmony to its 
members.  They referred to the brotherhood experience in the NLF as “mutual love.”  
This included recovering the dead from the battlefield and fair treatment from the top of 
the organization down (Berman, 1974).  The members of the NLF genuinely liked their 
comrades and the leadership of the organization, which was effective in maintaining 
loyalty. 
The Viet Cong also used the principle in its dealings with external governments 
and organizations.  In the domain of diplomacy, the representatives of the NLF always 
maintained the appearance of a likable organization.  The NLF maintained that it was a 
moderate organization that would maintain a neutral foreign policy to achieve 
reunification with North Vietnam.  They also maintained that prisoners of war, both 
American and Vietnamese, were always treated humanely and fairly.  The organization 
insisted that it was only representing the interests of a population that had been ill-treated 
and repressed by the government of South Vietnam (Pike, 1966).  They did everything in 
their power to get potential allies of the insurgency to like them. 
6. The Role of Authority 
The National Liberation Front also relied on authority to influence both the 
population and external governments.  According to Pike, the NLF brought order and 
authority to the generally anarchic rural villages.  It gave the people direction and simple 
orders that they could follow.  On the other hand, the insurgency realized the benefit of 
putting local community leaders in charge of the “liberated” areas, as long as these men 
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were indoctrinated with NLF beliefs.  These men were already established authority 
figures, which maintained continuity when the NLF began to take charge (Pike, 1966). 
The organizational structure of the NLF was designed to project as much 
authority as it could to both the population and the international community.  Its structure 
suggested legality and legitimate government.  In many cases, the arrival of the NLF in a 
particular area served to fill a power vacuum in the region.  According to Berman, “This 
lack of coherent government facilitated the Front’s access to the village and to the 
individual…” (Berman, 1974, p. 51).  The arrival of authority in an area devoid of any 
governmental structure was extremely powerful in gaining compliance.  An aspect of the 
NLF’s authority was its insistence on complete obedience.  Cialdini demonstrates that the 
power of the principle can cause individuals to perform act that they would not have 
normally done.  The same was true in South Vietnam.  In the NLF, obedience meant 
accepting any assignment, even ones involving terrorism, and its followers willingly 
complied (Berman, 1974). 
Authority of the NLF was essential to its legitimacy outside of Vietnam.  It had to 
maintain careful control of its outward relationship with the government of North 
Vietnam to appear legitimate.  Within the North, the government’s control of the 
insurgency improved its legitimacy, since it was backed by the official North Vietnamese 
government (Duiker, 1996).  Externally, however, it needed to appear autonomous in 
order to conduct effective relationship with the international community.  Thus, the NLF 
leadership maintained the image that it was essentially independent from the DRV.  If the 
insurgency was only viewed as a puppet of the DRV, it would not be taken seriously in 
diplomatic negotiations.  Given its acceptance by the Chinese government, they were at 
least partially successful in projecting diplomatic authority (Pike, 1966). 
7. The Role of Scarcity 
Scarcity, though sparingly used, was a small factor in the NLF’s influence over 
the South Vietnamese and its own members.  The use of this principle came primarily in 
the form of competition among members of its organization.  Occasionally, the leadership 
would hold contests between different groups within the NLF with the winners receiving 
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prestige and rewards.  As prestige was highly prized by the culture of South Vietnam, a 
chance to triumph over their peers gave each group great incentive to succeed.  The 
scarcity of both rewards and prestige within the organization was a motivating factor to 
win the contests.  Pike states that these challenges were highly contested, and that the 
required deeds were highly beneficial to the cause of the insurgency.  Through the 
scarcity principle, the NLF was able to inspire more fervor and quality in the actions of 
its members (Pike, 1966). 
8. Use of the Principles of Influence in Counterinsurgency Efforts 
The sources of influence of the counterinsurgency efforts in South Vietnam were 
generally based in the authority of the governments of South Vietnam and the United 
States.  These forces also attempted to utilize the principle of social proof in the strategic 
hamlet program, but this was generally ineffective in gaining a large base of support for 
the counterinsurgency.  The primary basis of influence was the authority of the South 
Vietnamese government, with the support of the government of the United States.  
Unfortunately, the role of the U.S. in the country also served as a prime motivator for 
insurgent forces.  DeFronzo states that the primary motivation for the revolution in 
Vietnam was the goal of casting off perceived foreign subjugation.  Additionally, the 
authority of the South Vietnamese government was undermined by its support by the 
U.S. government.  Its legitimacy was always questionable due to its foreign support.  This 
idea was validated by its inability to defend against the NLF’s onslaught following the 
departure of the United States (DeFronzo, 1991, p. 147). 
Counterinsurgency forces also attempted to use social proof in the strategic 
hamlet program.  This program was designed to organize communities together in order 
to undermine the influence of the Viet Cong.  By relying on the communal nature of the 
South Vietnamese peasants, South Vietnam and the U.S. attempted to use social proof to 
keep these communities together and prevent NLF infiltration.  This technique backfired 
because the peasants were unhappy with their removal from ancestral lands.  In fact, the 
program was a major factor in increasing the support for the NLF (DeFronzo, 1991, p. 
136). 
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Despite the efforts of the United States and South Vietnam to influence the local 
population, the counterinsurgency forces generally relied on the strength of the U.S. 
military in combating the NLF.  The United States and the government of South Vietnam 
held to the idea that superior force would eventually lead to victory over the insurgency, 
but this was not the case.  The lack of support by the people was a major factor in the 
eventual Communist takeover in Vietnam. 
G. PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY 
1. Background 
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA)—sometimes referred to as the 
Provos—was an insurgent group dedicated to the end of British rule in Northern Ireland 
and uniting Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland.  It conducted an armed 
campaign against the British police and military forces beginning in 1969.  While the 
IRA still exists as a political entity, it officially ended its armed campaign in 2005 and is 
no longer considered a threat to peace in Northern Ireland. 
The origins of the PIRA can be traced back to the 1916 Easter Uprising in Dublin 
and the establishment of the Republic of Ireland in 1921.  At the time, the IRA was a 
Marxist organization and desired a workers’ state to replace British rule.  Although the 
organization was a major factor in the 1920s and 1930s, it began to lose influence in the 
middle of the century.  By the time of the 1968 Civil Rights Movement, the IRA was 
disorganized and largely unable to protect the Catholic communities of Northern Ireland 
(English, 2003, pp. 81-120). 
In 1969, in response to an increase in violence and unrest, the British began to 
increase its military presence in the country.  The Official IRA was unable to protect the 
Catholic communities in Northern Ireland from the violence of the Protestant Unionists, 
which led to support for the fundamental split that resulted in the IRA.  The organization 
split into two separate entities: the Marxist Official IRA and the traditionalist Provisional 
IRA.  This support for the traditionalists led to the views of the PIRA becoming the 
dominant doctrine within the IRA as a whole (English, 2003, pp. 134-147). 
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The Provos also differed from the Official IRA in their view of violence.  The 
PIRA was in favor of rearming and renewing armed conflict with the ruling British 
government.  The British response to the increased violence was imprisonment without 
trial, and most of those incarcerated were later released for lack of cause.  The 
imprisoning of innocents and the seemingly indiscriminate arrests resulted in further 
enmity towards the British government (English, 2003, pp. 139-140). 
In 1972, the conflict dramatically escalated with the Bloody Sunday massacre and 
the subsequent response by the IRA.  Bloody Sunday became a rallying cry for the 
nationalists in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.  In light of the 
increasing violence, the British continued the policy of imprisonment.  These prisoners 
responded by conducting hunger strikes which gained them international notoriety and 
sympathy (English, 2003, p. 193). 
In 1975, the police force was given overall responsibility for operations against 
the IRA, but they still relied on the military for assistance.  As a result, the British began 
to rely more heavily on surveillance and a network of informants.  This informant 
network resulted in a multitude of arrests and a general sense of mistrust within the 
PIRA.  The mistrust within the network led to the execution of many IRA members on 
suspicion of informing for the British (English, 2003). 
During the 1980s, both sides conducted a campaign of strike-counterstrike.  The 
British would conduct operations of “lethal ambush” with a policy of shoot-to-kill, which 
led to IRA attacks on isolated stations of the police force.  The purpose of the IRA 
campaign in this period was to deter inward investment, oppose political stability, and 
broaden both internal and international support through propaganda (Moloney, 2002).  
Further attempts to escalate the conflict proved to be largely unsuccessful. 
Although the British could not defeat the IRA militarily, it was generally 
successful in containing the problem, and IRA leadership began to consider abandoning 
its armed campaign in favor of political means.  The IRA, however, continued the 
bombing campaign up to the mid-1990s, which proved financially burdensome to the 
British government.  The high cost of maintaining security in Northern Ireland was 
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pivotal to negotiations that resulted in a 1994 cease-fire.  The cease-fire was suspended 
for a brief period in 1996, but quickly resumed the following year.  This proved to be the 
effective end to IRA military operations (English, 2003). 
While the IRA never achieved their goal of a united Ireland, its campaign resulted 
in a rise in the influence of the IRA’s political wing, Sinn Fein.  The Sinn Fein party 
continues to hold significant numbers in the Northern Ireland Assembly, and it is the 
second largest political party in Northern Ireland.  The IRA was able to gain significant 
influence in the politics of the area, but its ultimate goal of a united Ireland remains 
unfulfilled. 
2. The Role of Reciprocation 
The principle of reciprocation was utilized by the Provisional IRA to gain 
influence within the Catholic population of Northern Ireland.  While important to the 
organization in producing compliance, the principle was used primarily within the IRA’s 
own community of Catholics.  In this case, the defense of the community was the primary 
benefit provided by the IRA. 
According to Richard English in his book, Armed Struggle, the Provisionals had a 
self-image of being the “necessary defenders”—an ethos that was firmly embedded in 
their psyche.  The PIRA was created from an immediate need for Catholic self-
protection, and it was this benefit that the organization provided to the population of 
Catholics.  English continues by stating that early enlistees to the cause joined at least 
partly because they were under attack by those in power (English, 2003).   
As part of the defense mission taken up by the IRA, the organization also used 
reciprocation to obtain loyalty from Catholic communities by providing arms.  In Ed 
Moloney’s study, A Secret History of the IRA, he explains that Catholic defense 
communities in Northern Ireland were eager to obtain weapons to fight the British and 
Loyalists in their communities.  In the early days of the IRA split, many Catholics were 
unsure of which side—the PIRA or OIRA—to give their allegiance.  These groups were, 
however, in desperate need of arms with which to defend their communities, and the 
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PIRA was willing to provide the necessary items (Moloney, 2002).  By providing 
essential weapons to the Catholic communities, the Provos utilized reciprocation to get 
compliance and allegiance. 
3. The Role of Commitment and Consistency 
The principle of commitment and consistency was evident from the initial 
formation of the Provisional IRA.  Robert White, in his book, Provisional Irish 
Republicans, describes the commitment taken by the Provisional Army Council.  The 
commitment came in the form of a public declaration proclaiming allegiance to the cause 
and the expulsion of the British from Ireland.  By making the declaration written and 
public, the Council’s commitment to the cause was strengthed (White, 1993). 
The initial construction of the Provisional IRA’s support base relied on 
commitment and consistency to attract members.  According to English, the PIRA’s 
nucleus was formed around those with lengthy prior involvement with the IRA in its 
previous iteration (English, 2003).  These stalwarts of the IRA’s cause were deeply 
committed to expelling the British from the North, and joining the PIRA demonstrated 
the consistency to that commitment.  These core members were disillusioned by the 
IRA’s previous ineffectiveness, and the PIRA provided a means to be consistent to their 
commitment. 
Another example of the principle of commitment at work within the membership 
of the Provisional IRA was the practice of hunger striking.  This practice was carried out 
by IRA members detained by the British in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  While the 
purpose of the strikes was to assert the detainees’ status as political prisoners (rather than 
criminals), it also exhibited their commitment to the IRA.  Hunger strikes were an 
ultimate physical demonstration of commitment, which demonstrates Cialdini’s assertion 
that actions strengthen the principle.  Additionally, the group of prisoners also publicly 
asserted the commitment to the hunger strikes, even if it resulted in their deaths.  This 
public statement put the prisoners’ commitment on record, which further augmented the 
power of the principle.  Finally, each prisoner was responsible for his own condition 
during the hunger strikes, which shows that the commitment was perceived to be his 
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choice—another point made by Cialdini concerning the principle (White, 1993).  
Although the strikes were not practiced by many, they served as a model of commitment 
to the IRA’s goal of undermining the British. 
4. The Role of Social Proof 
Social proof was heavily utilized by the IRA in gaining influence among the 
Catholic population in Northern Ireland.  The uncertainty of the situation and the 
similarity between the IRA members and the Catholic population as a whole both served 
to enhance the power of the principle.  In this particular conflict, uncertainty was rule, not 
the exception.  The violence perpetrated by both sides of the conflict caused a great deal 
of uncertainty in the everyday lives of those in Northern Ireland.  This uncertainty 
basically forced every citizen to choose a side, and similarity was a deciding factor in that 
choice. 
From the beginning of the split, similarity was extremely important in enlisting 
members to the PIRA’s cause.  Membership was often based entirely on the surrounding 
people in each community.  If those in a particular neighborhood tended to side with the 
IRA, then the rest followed.  When daily life was always uncertain, the people tended to 
cling to choices made by those around them.  Socioeconomic class was also a common 
similarity shared by the members of the IRA.  In describing the early period of the 
insurgency, White provides convincing evidence of the role of social proof.  He shows 
that from 1969 to 1972, forty-five Belfast Provisionals were killed during IRA 
operations.  All of those killed were in the working class; none had a university 
education; and the average age was twenty-one (White, 1993).  This demonstrates 
striking similarity between the members of the IRA, and the effect that had on social 
proof.  Later in his book, White summarizes the power of this principle: 
…[for those] who became Republicans, involvement in political violence 
resulted in a conscious decision in which he embraced what he believed to 
be the most effective approach for bringing about political change.  
Importantly, his own political awareness developed in concert with the 
developing political awareness of other people in his social circle. (1993) 
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5. The Role of Liking 
While similarity was clearly evident in increasing the effectiveness of social proof 
within the Catholic communities in Northern Ireland, it was also an important factor in 
the IRA’s gaining influence through the principle of liking.  Liking was certainly evident 
with the North’s Catholic communities, but the principle was particularly powerful in 
achieving influence outside of the North.  This principle was the primary means by which 
the Provisionals got support outside of the immediate area of the conflict. 
Similarity had a particularly powerful effect on the support of those in the South 
(the Republic of Ireland).  The similarity arose from a feeling of national identity present 
in Irish of the South, an identity that links the people of the North and the South.  The 
feeling of kinship between the two populations sparked demonstrations and violence in 
the South in response to the actions of the British (White, 1993).  The Southern Irish had 
a greater similarity to the Northern Republicans, as opposed to the British, which 
produced a wave of support from the people.  This support, however, waned as the 
conflict continued into the late 1980s.  Despite the sense of identity experienced between 
the two populations, the increasingly terroristic nature of the IRA attacks soured the 
Southern Irish against the Provisionals in the North.  With the added fear of the conflict 
spilling over into the South, the people increasingly distanced themselves from the 
Northern Republicans (Bell, 1997).  Thus, support from the Republic decreased as dislike 
for the means used by the IRA increased. 
A similar pattern was evident in support from groups from the United States.  In 
the early days of the Provisional IRA, fundraising in the United States provided a great 
deal of financial support for the IRA’s campaign.  Just as in the Republic of Ireland, Irish 
Americans (especially in New England) sympathized with the cause of the Provisionals 
due to the same sense of identity.  The Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID) was 
established in New York to raise funds for the campaign.  The committee had great 
success among the working-class Irish Americans.  This support also came in the form of 
and arms smuggling route between the United States and Northern Ireland (English, 
2003).  This support, however, also waned as the conflict continued, and support groups 
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increasingly dedicated their funds towards the peace process (Bell, 1997).  As in the 
Republic of Ireland, support from the United States dwindled as the principle of liking 
became less apparent. 
According to White, contact and association were also heavily utilized by the 
Provos to drum up support in the Republic of Ireland.  White states that nationalism alone 
could not incite the Southern Irish, or there would have been a much larger incidence of 
active support for the IRA in the South.  He argues that the support they did receive was 
as much a result of contact as it was a result of intense nationalism.  He states that the less 
restrictive environment in the South allowed the IRA to organize responses among the 
sympathetic nationalists.  This contact allowed for the development of social ties, and 
made the conflict much more personal for the Southern Republicans (White, 1993).   
The IRA also used association to improve their likability to the Southern Irish, as 
well as others in Northern Ireland.  The IRA’s chief association was with Catholicism.  
Their association with the religion (and the ideals that came with it) increased their 
likability in the overwhelming Catholic Republic.  As a nationalist republican movement, 
the IRA was associated with a return to the Irish traditions, including the use of the Irish 
Gaelic language.  The “Irishness” that the IRA upheld was vastly appealing to the 
Catholic communities in both the North and the South.  By associating the organization 
with those traditions, the insurgency appeared to stand for desirable ideals, despite the 
means it used to achieve those goals (English, 2003). 
6. Other Uses of the Principles of Influence by the IRA 
The Provisional IRA also used authority in gaining influence within the Catholic 
communities of Northern Ireland.  The use of the scarcity principle was evident in the 
research conducted in this study.  The primary sources of authority for the PIRA were 
Catholicism and family.  Not only did Catholicism play a role in the organization’s 
likability, but it also added a sense of authority to the group.  The IRA’s campaign was 




support for the IRA implied support for Catholicism.  This authority, however, was not 
officially sanctioned, so its effectiveness in gaining compliance was far less than the 
social aspects of Catholicism (English, 2003). 
Authority also derived from the family dynamic of the Catholic communities.  
Many IRA members were from Republican families.  These families indoctrinated their 
children with a hatred for the British and the ideals of the Republican cause.  The other 
lesson passed down from parents to children was that violence could be effective in 
removing the British from the country, as related in stories of the rebellion of 1916.  
Through their parents, children were raised to support the expulsion of the British from 
Northern Ireland, and many of these children joined the Provisionals.  The authority of 
the Republican parents was instrumental in influencing the younger generation to support 
the IRA (White, 1993). 
7. Use of the Principles of Influence in Counterinsurgency Efforts 
With the reintroduction of violence into the politics of Northern Ireland, the initial 
response of the British forces was that of repression and violence.  Repression of the 
Catholic communities greatly undermined any efforts to infiltrate and gain influence in 
those communities.  British forces never were fully successful in influencing these 
communities.  Rather, it was the indiscriminate nature of the PIRA attacks that ultimately 
led to its downfall. 
The British use of reciprocation also led to the cessation of violence by the PIRA.  
Realizing that they could never stamp out the insurgency with violence and repression 
alone, the British eventually conceded many political rights and positions to Irish 
Republicans, which helped aid an end to the violence.  It was a realization among many 
Irish Catholics that cooperation with the British would better serve their cause that 
continued support of IRA violence.   
The British also demonstrated the use of commitment to bring about an end to 
violence.  The British government made clear that they were committed to keeping 
Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom, unless the entire population (both 
Catholic and Protestant) wished otherwise.  Aware of the commitment of the British 
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government and the Protestant communities in Northern Ireland, the leaders of the PIRA 
began to retreat from the earlier assertion that violence was the only way to win (English, 
2003, pp. 362-366).  The British commitment and the opposition of the Catholic 
communities to further violence eventually led to the disarming of the IRA. 
H. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I applied Robert Cialdini’s six principles of influence to six 
different case studies of historical insurgencies.  These insurgencies had varying degrees 
of success, both politically and militarily.  These six principles—reciprocation, 
commitment and consistency, social proof, liking, authority, and scarcity—were each 
used to varying degrees by the insurgent groups.  In some cases, a principle was 
recognized and actively exploited by the insurgents.  In others, a principle would have an 
enormous impact without active utilization by the insurgency itself.  In each case several 
or all of Cialdini’s principles played an important role in the spread of the insurgency’s 
influence to its targets of compliance.  The next chapter will examine these findings in 
more detail. 
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IV. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
Chapter III demonstrated the utilization of Cialdini’s six principles of influence 
by six different historical insurgencies.  Each insurgent group tailored its manipulation of 
targets of compliance according to its desired goals and unique political climate.  The 
success of the tactics varied, but proper application of the principles often resulted in 
significant gains in the insurgency’s influence, internally and externally.  The 
insurgencies’ understanding of the local population also promoted proper use of the 
principles, and presented a formidable barrier to counterinsurgency efforts. 
A. GENERAL USE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INFLUENCE 
What determines the actions taken by insurgent leaders to influence internal and 
external audiences?  The answer is: it depends.  Unique cultural and political climates 
result in specific methods employed for each case.  On the other hand, it is apparent that 
some principles were extensively used by the insurgencies—and some sparingly—in 
every case.  Additionally, the success or failure of an insurgency is not necessarily 
contingent upon the use of particular principles.  It seems, however, that proper 
understanding and application of the principles of influence—along with a grasp of the 
desires and motivations of the target audience—are important to success.   
Table 1 summarizes the use of the principles of influence by the insurgencies.  
The results of the study showed that there were varying degrees of the use of Cialdini’s 
principles in the six cases.  In a particular case, a principle was either not present, used in 
a limited capacity, or extensively used in the insurgent campaign.  Limited use of a 
principle implies that the insurgency did not rely on the principle to gain influence, but 
that it was useful in smaller ways.  Extensive use of a principle implies that the 
insurgency heavily utilized the principle in order to gain influence.  The relative success 
of the use of a principle is also reflected in this table.  Success implies that the insurgency 
was able to gain significant influence through the use of a principle.  Limited success 
implies that influence was gained, but not to the desired extent. 
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Table 1.   Insurgents’ Use of Cialdini’s Principles of Influence 
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The frequency of use of each of Cialdini’s six principles varies from case to case.  
The decision to use a particular principle is influenced by many factors.  These factors 
include cultural tendencies, the economic situation of the population, a leader’s personal 
methods, the goals of the insurgency, and many more.  Table 1 shows that two of the 
principles, reciprocation and scarcity, were not used by insurgencies as often as the other 
four principles.  On the other hand, commitment and consistency, social proof, liking, and 
authority were at present in either an extensive or limited capacity in all six cases. 
Reciprocation is one of Cialdini’s principles that did not appear in all six cases.  
The NLF and the PIRA both used reciprocation extensively and with some success.  The 
NLF and the PIRA based much of their influence campaign on inducing a sense of 
obligation on the local populations.  Both organizations could provide something desired 
by the people.  M-26-7 also utilized reciprocation, but to a more limited extent.  They 
generally used the principle in mutually beneficial agreements with local populations.  
The Bolsheviks were even more limited in their use of reciprocation.  The use of the 
principle was mostly limited to promises, rather than immediate tangible benefits.  These 
promises, however, did prove to be quite effective on the working class of Russia.  This 
study did not find any significant evidence of the use of reciprocation by EOKA or Mau 
Mau.  It can be argued that the hope of a desired political outcome represented by these 
groups was a factor in inducing an obligation, but the insurgencies did not actively 
employ the principle. 
Commitment and consistency was present in either an extensive or limited 
capacity in all six cases.  Although some groups used the principle more than others, it 
seems that some form of commitment is necessary for conducting an insurgent campaign.  
The Mau Mau, in particular, extensively used the principle to its full effect.  The 
organization took advantage of the cultural proclivity to the act of taking oaths.  EOKA 
also made use of specific verbal oaths to the cause of the insurgency, and to good effect.  
The NLF relied on the use of the principle to recruit and keep its members.  Berman’s 
study documents the extent of the principle’s use, and the enormous success gained from 
its proper use.  The PIRA often took commitment and consistency to an extreme level.  
Consistency was influential in establishing the organization’s power base, but it was the 
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consistency exhibited in the hunger strikes that demonstrate the power of this principle in 
this particular case.  The Bolsheviks and M-26-7 made limited use of the principle, and 
generally only within their small circles of leadership.  While public statements 
exhibiting commitment to their causes were frequent in both cases, the specific utilization 
of the principle was minimal. 
As with commitment and consistency, social proof was also present in either an 
extensive or limited capacity in all six cases.  Use of social proof was generally more 
heavily relied upon in situations where cultures exhibited a strong sense of community.  
This was either because of necessity due to repression, a strong religious aspect, or an 
historic cultural tendency.  EOKA, Mau Mau, and the IRA represented repressed 
populations with a strong sense of religion within the community.  These factors resulted 
in heavy use of the social proof principle.  The NLF operated in generally isolated 
villages where recent hardship and historical reliance on community created an ideal 
situation for exploitation using the principle.  M-26-7 and the Bolsheviks were rather 
limited in their use of social proof.  While uncertainty played a role in strengthening this 
principle, the divisive nature of the conflicts inhibited its use.  Castro was able to use the 
principle in the rural areas in which he operated, but Lenin was limited by the urban 
nature of his operating area. 
Liking was also present in either an extensive or limited capacity in all six 
insurgencies.  Five out of the six cases showed an extensive use of the liking principle, 
while only one made limited use of the principle.  All six insurgencies devoted effort to 
contact, similarity, and association in order to get other groups to like them.  For some 
insurgencies, such as EOKA, it took minimal effort to promote liking with both the Greek 
Cypriots and the people of Greece.  These groups were already inclined to like the 
insurgent organizations due to cultural similarity and association with ideals.  This was 
also the case with the IRA, but they also utilized contact to strengthen the effectiveness of 
the principle.  It was more difficult for the Mau Mau, due to their strange and often brutal 
customs, but liking was easier to employ within the Kikuyu community.  The Bolsheviks 
mainly used association to influence the Russia people.  Due a severely divided culture 
(and multiple competing factions) Lenin was limited to the party’s association with 
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socialism and representation of the proletariat in using the liking principle.  The NLF and 
M-26-7 both used the principle extensively, internally and externally.  As these 
populations were not necessarily culturally inclined to like the organizations, active 
methods of liking were necessary to gain influence.  Both of these insurgencies were 
extremely successful in utilizing the principle. 
Authority was also used by all six insurgencies in either an extensive or limited 
capacity.  The sources of authority in each of the cases fall into several categories.  In 
four of the six cases, a strong, central authority figure was present, although the level of 
control practiced by the authority figure varied.  Three of the four groups relied on the 
authority figure for direction and prestige.  M-26-7, the Bolshevik Party, and EOKA were 
dependent upon the authority of their leadership.  While Kenyatta had little influence on 
the everyday operations of the Mau Mau, the cult of his authority was extremely 
influential in gaining influence.  His person was not necessary for the existence of the 
Mau Mau, but his demigod status was.  The IRA and the NLF, however, were more 
limited in their use of authority.  The most effective use of the principle by these groups 
was on a more local level where personal contact was present.  The NLF did attempt to 
use authority outside of the local level, but with limited success. 
Religious authority was played an important role in three of the six cases, and it 
was a limited factor in two others.  EOKA, the IRA, and the Mau Mau used the 
population’s identification with religious life to at least give the appearance of authority.  
EOKA was the only case where a strong central leader was also a legitimate religious 
authority, which the insurgency used to great effect, both at home and abroad.  The IRA 
was not officially sanctioned by the Catholic Church, but the authority of the church was 
utilized in more local settings.  The Mau Mau completely fabricated religious authority 
by creating a new one.  By elevating Kenyatta to a demigod, and invoking the spiritual 
superstition of the Kikuyu, the Mau Mau used religious authority to great effect.  The 
White Armies in Russia also used religious authority to gain support of the peasant 
population, but was limited in its success.  Additionally, religious authority played a very 
small role in the influence of the NLF.  This was due to the oppression of the Buddhists 
by the Diem regime which favored Christianity. 
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Active use of the scarcity principle was seldom evident in any of the six cases in 
this study.  The most common iteration of the principle was Cialdini’s idea of newly 
experienced scarcity.  The insurgencies, however, were not necessarily required to act in 
order for scarcity to be a factor.  Any opportunity to utilize scarcity was generally 
brought about by the nation-state against which the insurgency was fighting.  Due to their 
inability to understand cultures or desire for power, leaders of the nation-states 
inadvertently invoked the principle.   
B. THE EFFECT OF COMBINATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES 
This study has demonstrated the manner in which Cialdini’s principles of 
influence are used individually, but combinations were also exhibited in this study.  One 
combination that was particularly powerful in gaining influence was the use of both 
authority and liking.  Whether through physical attractiveness, association, or similarity 
the leaders of these insurgencies utilized the principle of liking to augment their 
authority.  Kenyatta was described as a very attractive man, an attribute which increased 
his likability.  As Kenyatta was well-liked, the Kikuyu were more inclined to accept him 
as an authority figure, and as a religious icon.  Fidel Castro was an eloquent and talented 
speaker, who championed the rights of the common worker and peasants during his fight 
with the Batista regime.  These attributes contributed to his authority both in Cuba and 
outside of the country.  While Lenin was an extremely complicated man, his image as a 
representative of the working class improved his likability both in and out of his circle of 
socialists.  Lenin was never easily liked as a man, but his total internalization of the 
socialist cause afforded him a strong sense of respect in his authority.  The two leaders of 
EOKA, Grivas and Makarios, were also well-liked by the Greek Cypriots.  Grivas was 
intensely loyal to his people, and Makarios was a charismatic religious leader.  Both of 
these aspects were utilized in augmenting each man’s authority. 
Another powerful combination of the principles of influence is that of liking and 
social proof.  Both of these principles are strengthened by similarity, so it is natural for 
the two to be utilized in tandem.  The IRA used this combination particularly well in the 
Catholic communities of Northern Ireland.  The members of the IRA were well-liked in 
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these communities because of their similarity, and they were often family members or 
good friends.  While the violent actions of the IRA members were not always supported, 
their likability made them more likely to be followed in the uncertain atmosphere of 
Northern Ireland.   
The other insurgency who used this combination extensively was the NLF.  Their 
tactic of sending NLF members back to their own villages in order to recruit friends and 
family took advantage of both of the principles.  As members of the community, they 
were already well-liked by the villagers.  The uncertainty of the conflict allowed the NLF 
take advantage of social proof by sending these well liked community members to the 
villages to provide direction.  As one family began to support the cause, the rest of the 
village followed.  
While these two combinations seem to be the most heavily utilized, other 
combinations were also present in the cases in this study.  The Mau Mau used a mixture 
of commitment and religious authority in order to recruit the Kikuyu to its organization.  
The oathing ceremonies conducted by the insurgency used the cultural inclination 
towards commitment along with their twisting of traditional religious practices to create 
an extremely powerful commitment.  The NLF also used this combination in their 
indoctrination practices.  As Berman states in his study, “Obedience implied, in the 
Front’s ideal, absolute conformity to a strict code of proper conduct and total submission 
to authority; without these ingredients commitment could not be complete” (Berman, 
1974). 
Another combination occasionally utilized by the insurgencies was that of scarcity 
and reciprocation.  Although the two principles were not as heavily utilized as the other 
four, the combination of the two proved to be effective, particularly with the NLF and the 
Bolsheviks.  The working and peasant classes of Russia suffered from newly experienced 
scarcity due to Russia’s involvement in World War I.  In rural Russia, land was a scarce 
commodity due to control by the government for purposes of war.  The Bolsheviks’ use 




NLF realized that scarcity of land could amplify the effectiveness of reciprocity in the 
villages of South Vietnam.  They were able to gain influence in the country by utilizing 
this combination. 
C. THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES 
In this study, no particular principle of influence appears to be the most important 
to an insurgency’s achieving influence, or to the insurgency’s overall success.  There are 
however, a few relationships between success and the use of particular principles.  
Generally, the utilization of scarcity and reciprocation was not universal across all six 
cases.  Conversely, the other four principles were at least present in an extensive or 
limited capacity in all six cases.  This demonstrates the relative importance assigned by 
the leadership of these insurgencies.  On the other hand, scarcity and reciprocation were 
often taken for granted by the organizations without active employment of either of these 
principles.  Thus, these two principles may not have been deliberately ignored; they may 
have been inherent the insurgency-population relationship. 
Three of the six insurgencies, M-26-7, the Bolshevik Party, and the NLF, were 
completely successful, both militarily and politically.  All three of these organizations 
were able to overthrow the existing government and seize power for themselves.  
Interestingly, the NLF was the only one of these three that made full use of all six 
principles of influence.  Authority and liking, on the other hand, were extensively used by 
all three of these insurgencies, while the other four principles were used in a more limited 
capacity, with the exception of the NLF.  The NLF was also different in that it did not 
have a strong central authority figure, such as Fidel Castro or Vladimir Lenin.  Rather, it 
relied on the authority of its organizational structure to gain internal influence.  While the 
three most successful insurgencies extensively used authority, the least successful one, 
the IRA, was the most limited in the use of authority.  While a causal relationship 
between these two principles and success cannot be established, there seems to be some 
relationship between the two.  
A common theme among all six cases is the importance of the principle of 
commitment and consistency.  Verbal oaths, written statements, acts of commitment, or a 
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combination thereof were present in some capacity in establishing influence in all six 
cases.  Additionally, commitments in the six cases all involved public acts of some kind.  
Cialdini stressed that public acts were important to internalizing a commitment and 
making it personal.  This phenomenon seems to be especially important with the 
leadership of the organization itself.  Both M-26-7 and the Bolshevik Party primarily 
employed commitment within its central leadership; and their use of the principle outside 
of the organization was fairly limited.  This may indicate that commitment is essential in 
maintaining influence over an insurgent organization. 
Despite these relationships, this study did not find any causal relationship between 
the individual principles and the ultimate success of the insurgency.  It seems, rather, that 
it is the correct cultural understanding of the targets of compliance that dictate both the 
use of a particular principle and the relative success of that use.  The results do indicate 
some relative importance of each particular influence principle. 
D. EFFECTS OF THE PRINCIPLES AT VARYING LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
The subjects of each case study used the principles of influence to varying 
degrees on different levels.  The principles were employed to a much higher degree and 
with much greater success on the local population and its own members.  While the local 
population and the members of the insurgencies could be considered separate entities, the 
“with us or against us” nature of insurgent organizations inclined the leadership to treat 
them as one in the same.  These insurgents usually operated among the populations which 
they claimed to represent, and every member of the target population was a potential 
member of the insurgency, either in an active or supporting role. 
All six principles were employed in seeking compliance from both the local 
population and its own members, but not in each individual case.  Two principles, 
scarcity and reciprocation, were evident only on internal audiences with no evidence of 
use on external audiences.  This may be due to the fact that insurgencies generally had 
nothing to offer external audiences, and insurgencies were usually in a position of 
requestor in dealing with external audiences. 
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Social proof and commitment and consistency were almost exclusively used to 
gain influence with internal audiences.  Only one instance of each of the two principles 
was observed in situations involving external audiences.  These instances were the 
Bolshevik’s use of social proof in external fundraising and the NLF’s use of commitment 
and consistency in soliciting international support.  Additionally, the relative success of 
these two instances was limited at best, and did not significantly contribute to gaining 
influence. 
Liking and authority were used to a large degree both internally and externally.  
These two principles were much more successful internally than externally, but they were 
also the most effective of the six principles in eliciting compliance from external 
audiences.  This may be due to the fact that authority lent a sense of legitimacy to an 
insurgency in the eyes of external audiences.  Additionally, the aspect of association in 
inducing likability may have been important to gaining external support.  An external 
entity’s sympathy towards the ultimate goals of the insurgent organization was essential 
to the likability of the insurgency. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORTS 
This study has demonstrated the utilization of Cialdini’s principles of influence in 
six different insurgencies.  How can these observations be used by militaries and 
governments in counterinsurgency campaigns?  The analysis of these cases has shown 
that the support of the local population is essential to the success of an insurgency.  
Furthermore cultural understanding of the target audiences is vital to the proper use of the 
influence principles and the resulting influence gained.  This knowledge can be employed 
by counterinsurgency forces as well.  The proper understanding of a target audience’s 
culture and motivations can greatly contribute to determining which influence principles 
will be most effective in eliciting compliance.  Counterinsurgency efforts in these six 
cases often failed due to the lack of understanding, and the use of cultural anthropologists 
and local liaisons may be the first step in improving this understanding.  These methods 
are currently utilized by Coalition Forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and have been 
met with some success. 
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Another method that may have an impact on undermining the influence of an 
insurgency is to use the principles against them.  The British use of pseudo gangs in 
combating the Mau Mau proved to be quite successful.  They were able to exploit the 
Kikuyu reliance on commitment to infiltrate and eliminate many guerrilla enclaves.  By 
outwardly making a commitment to the insurgency, the Mau Mau guerrillas fully 
accepted the infiltrators, which resulted in their undoing.  Undermining or diminishing 
the effect of the principles used by the insurgencies may be effective in gaining influence 
for counterinsurgency forces. 
Reciprocation also seems to be effective in a counterinsurgency campaign.  The 
British utilized reciprocation in Northern Ireland by providing concessions to the 
Catholic communities.  These concessions for more prominent roles in government 
served to address the concerns of the population, and the British were able to undermine 
the support of the violence perpetrated by the IRA.   
One additional use of the principles that could prove effective in gaining influence 
is to employ the principle of liking.  Liking was heavily utilized by insurgent 
organizations to get compliance from external organizations, and this phenomenon could 
be effective for counterinsurgency forces in influencing local populations.  All six 
insurgencies gained strength from improper treatment by the ruling governments and 
militaries.  This often resulted in increased support for insurgencies.  The lesson to be 
learned from this observation is that ill treatment of the population will result in a surge 
of support for the opposing forces.  Counterinsurgency campaigns must make every 
effort to conduct fair and civil relations with the local populations.  This could have an 
enormous effect on both support for the counterinsurgency and the insurgency’s lack 
thereof. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has described the factors that determine the types of actions taken by 
insurgent leaders in influencing internal and external audiences using Cialdini’s six 
principles of influence.  It has described Cialdini’s framework and explained the methods 
used to enhance the effectiveness of the principles.  This thesis has also defined 
insurgency and applied the principles of influence to six case studies of insurgency.  It 
analyzed the use of these principles and explained the relative importance of each one.  
The resulting study has provided insight into the methods of influence, the levels at 
which these methods are utilized, and possible techniques to counter insurgent 
organizations’ use of the principles. 
Prior to this work, a study of the influence of insurgencies had not been conducted 
using Cialdini’s framework.  This framework highlights basic human psychological 
influences in the area of compliance, which may be useful to the study of insurgent 
organizations.  With military research currently focused on the understanding of the inner 
workings of these organizations, this thesis may be beneficial to this understanding.  
Further research is required in order to fully explore the multitude of methods used by 
insurgencies to gain influence.  A quantitative study of every recent historically 
significant insurgency could provide a more complete picture of the methods used in 
Cialdini’s framework.  Additionally, a focused study of one particular insurgency may 
provide insights beyond the scope of this study.  While this thesis has not provided the 
ultimate solution to combating insurgent organizations, it has offered some insight into 
the influence strategies of insurgents on a basic level. 
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